On the Impact of Low-Rate Attacks


Show simple item record Guirguis, Mina en_US Bestavros, Azer en_US Matta, Ibrahim en_US 2011-10-20T05:23:42Z 2011-10-20T05:23:42Z 2006-02-06 en_US
dc.description.abstract Recent research have exposed new breeds of attacks that are capable of denying service or inflicting significant damage to TCP flows, without sustaining the attack traffic. Such attacks are often referred to as "low-rate" attacks and they stand in sharp contrast against traditional Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that can completely shut off TCP flows by flooding an Internet link. In this paper, we study the impact of these new breeds of attacks and the extent to which defense mechanisms are capable of mitigating the attack's impact. Through adopting a simple discrete-time model with a single TCP flow and a nonoblivious adversary, we were able to expose new variants of these low-rate attacks that could potentially have high attack potency per attack burst. Our analysis is focused towards worst-case scenarios, thus our results should be regarded as upper bounds on the impact of low-rate attacks rather than a real assessment under a specific attack scenario. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship National Science Foundation (EIA-0202067, ITR ANI-0205294, CNS-0524477) en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Boston University Computer Science Department en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries BUCS Technical Reports;BUCS-TR-2006-002 en_US
dc.subject Security en_US
dc.subject TCP en_US
dc.subject Denial of service en_US
dc.subject Low-rate attacks en_US
dc.title On the Impact of Low-Rate Attacks en_US
dc.type Technical Report en_US

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search OpenBU


Deposit Materials