Recent Hegel Literature: The Jena Period and the Phenomenology of Spirit

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Hegel arrived in Jena early in 1801, freed from his tutorial duties by the inheritance he received upon the death of his father. There he aided Schelling in the editing of the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, won a post at the university, published a series of long articles in the *Journal* and accumulated a pile of lecture notes which have seen the light of day only in our century. He departed from the town rather hastily in 1807 leaving behind a university closed as a result of Napoleon's victory over the forces of the Holy Roman Empire and a book, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, finished on the eve of the battle.

It would seem easier to make sense out of Hegel's activities in this period than to come to grips with his writings from the Berne and Frankfurt periods. There he was embarked on a project whose outlines are obscure and whose intent is difficult to recapture. At Jena he had become a systematic philosopher. From Frankfurt we have but two pages of what seems to be a comprehensive philosophical system. From Jena we have what will amount to four volumes of system drafts and lecture notes. In his early period his writing is couched in an odd combination of Tübingen theology, critical philosophy, and moral psychology. In Jena, post-Kantian philosophy wins out. However clumsy the writings seem, at least the sources for the terms are known: Schelling, Fichte, and Kant. And above all, the early period ends with a whimper; his theologico-political treatise is never brought to a coherent conclusion. Jena ends with Napoleon and a book. Rarely has any period in a thinker's life had such a clearly drawn conclusion.

Matters of course are not as they seem, and difficulties cannot be escaped. First of all there is the problem of that book. Hegel's attempt to hold out a ladder by which one may ascend from ordinary knowledge to the Absolute results in a more difficult climb than his benign metaphor suggests. The ladder sets one off on a rougher trail, which in turn leads to rock faces, glaciers, sudden storms, and the bleached bones of quite a few unwary climbers who made the ascent not knowing what they would find in the higher elevations. Early ascents seemed to assume that if one could find one clear motif — for Kojève, the dialectic of master and slave, for Wahl, the unhappy consciousness, for Heidegger, the discussion of knowledge in the Introduction of the book, for Lukacs, the discussion of the self-estranged spirit — a safe path to the Absolute might be beaten with a minimum of difficulties. The less than successful results of these efforts have not seemed to disuade a few contemporary authors that indeed this is, as advertised, a propaedeutic and that one can make the climb with little advanced preparation. The results in the last ten years have been a few more bodies on the higher elevations.

In part the problem may lie in the second apparent advantage the Jena writings have over the writings of Hegel's theological period. The languages spoken here are recognizable easily enough, but Hegel's pidgin isn't. Within the *System der Sittlichkeit*, for instance, Hegel moves from a set of terms derived from Schelling ("Potenz,"
"Indifference") to some terms which may or may not be of Kantian origin ("Reflection" being one of the most problematic), to something which sounds for all the world like the "real" Hegel (periodic cameos by "Aufhebung"). But perhaps the greatest problem lies with all of those carefully preserved Systementwürfe which span volumes 6-8 of the new critical edition (with Volume 5 on the way); the pidgin which makes little sense in a given period becomes absolutely bewildering if traced over time. It is not even enough that from the earliest hints of the "Jena System" (the 1802 System der Sittlichkeit) to the 1807 Phenomenology we have a constant mutation of terminology and organization from system to system; within the 1803-1804 System der Spezulative Philosophie, we have a text which is literally a palimpsest. A rewriting and expansion of lectures delivered at Jena, the system draft consists of a series of fragments which represent a number of different levels of reworking. Düsing and Kimmerle, whose edition is the first to give a faithful representation of the actual state of the manuscripts, have employed as a basic text a series of sheets on which a three to four centimeter margin is filled with a fragmentary précis of what appears to be a still more basic text (now lost), a précis which served as the basis for a further expansion. As Kimmerle has noted in his own study of Hegel's system of philosophy in this period, if the marginal notes are still within the identity philosophy he worked out in tandem with Schelling, the expansions and reworkings already point towards the later Hegel. In short, upon closer examination one finds that there is no Jena System, but only a set of fragmentary drafts of systems, a point which holds true for "Hegel's System" as a whole.

If the problems we face in coming to terms with Hegel's Phenomenology and the works which preceed it are considerable, we can at least take heart in the fact that we are finally in a reasonable position to know what the problems are and can feel some measure of certainty about the adequacy of the resources which we have available in confronting these issues. This is the period for which we have by far the most adequate editions of Hegel's work, thanks to the work of Otto Pöggeler and his collaborators at the Hegel Archiv in Bochum. Volume 4 of the Gesammelte Werke, available since 1968, provides a critical edition of the published works from this period: the articles from the Critical Journal of Philosophy and Hegel's first acknowledged published work, the monograph from 1801, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy. Volume 6 contains, as previously mentioned, the extant portions of the 1803-1804 System of Speculative Philosophy (a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of spirit), Volume 7 contains the Logic, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Nature from the 1804-1805 lecture cycle, while Volume 8 contains the Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit from 1805-1806. Volume 5 will contain the System der Sittlichkeit of 1802 and some previously unpublished manuscripts from 1801, used by Rosenkranz in his 1844 biography, but only recently recovered. The import of these editions lies not only in their bringing some new material before the public for the first time (in Volume 5) but also in their being the first critical editions of the later sections of the Jena writings, texts which have been available since Hoffmeister's editions of the 1930s but which were prepared by him in a way which often did considerable violence to the

original manuscripts. Indeed, in the case of the *Logic, Metaphysics* and *Philosophy of Nature* contained now in Volume 7, Hoffmeister erroneously dated the work as proceeding the materials now contained in Volume 6, thus giving rise to the misinterpretation (shared by Lukacs, Marcuse, Plant and others) that this work in some way forms the foundation for both of the lecture cycles, and setting off a good deal of fruitless speculation as to how Hegel could descend from the conceptual sophistication of the logic to embrace a more straightforward Schelling-type approach in the writings from 1802-1804. It is also a period in which readers restricted to English translations have recently been very well served. What is most likely to draw attention here is the long-awaited new translation of the *Phenomenology*.\(^3\) For years those struggling through Baillie's translation could blame the translation for the difficulties of the text and console themselves with the illusion that it all must be easier in the original. A.V. Miller's translation, though not always as resourceful or as consistent as those portions of the Kenley Dove translation which have been published or privately circulated, avoids the Victorian gear-grinding that marked too many of the passages in Baillie's rendering and provides a text in which one may be reasonably certain that the difficulties and obscurities one faces are those of the original. At times one may quibble with Miller's choice of terms — the use of "Notion" for "Begriff" instead of the more literal "Concept" is one of the more annoying since it requires either the use of the horrendous "notional" rather than the more sensible "conceptual" in the frequent adjectival uses of the term, or breaking the consistency of the translation and hiding the fact that "Notion" and "conceptual" are kindred terms. One may also regret the failure to provide an adequate footnote apparatus to alert readers with some knowledge of German what in fact is going on in the book, but perhaps such a procedure would be overly fussy in a translation whose greatest virtue is the directness and lucidity with which it presents its message.

T.M. Knox's translation of the long essay from the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* on *Natural Law* of 1802-1803 is even more impressive.\(^4\) The difficulties of the work in German are legendary, and are matched only by the *System der Sittlichkeit*. Knox has provided a remarkably readable and, for the most part, accurate translation — muddy where Hegel is muddy, precise when he, in his own way, is precise. Notes from the *Gesammelte Werke* version have been incorporated and provide the reader with some notion of what passages in Kant, Fichte and others Hegel is in fact making reference to in this rather tightly argued attack on Kantian and Fichtian approaches to social contract theories. The one sour note of Knox's translation is a swipe (49) at Manfred Riedel's extraordinarily helpful essay "Hegel's Kritik des Naturrechts,"\(^5\) a study of the transformation in Hegel's practical philosophy during the Jena period which points up quite lucidly the methodological gulf which separates this essay of 1802 from the later *Rechtsphilosophie*. Indeed, one can only feel regret that Riedel's essay was not translated for use as an introduction to this edition. While the late H.B. Acton provides a helpful summary of the argument and explains at least some of the theoretical background in the writings of Kant and Fichte which is needed to come to terms with the argument, his introduction is rather unhelpful when Hegel plunges headlong into the terminology which he had taken over from Schelling and begun to reformulate.

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Knox has also translated with Harris the companion piece to the *Natural Law* essay, the 1802 *System der Sittlichkeit*. Much of the deeper content of the *Natural Law* essay, most especially the model of the ethical whole which Hegel begins to outline in the final part of the essay, is simply gibberish without some knowledge of the theoretical framework in which Hegel's reflections on natural law must be placed. But the framework is hardly clearer than the worst moments of the essay itself. There are few works in which one can become so totally lost as the *System der Sittlichkeit*. Being apparently only a fragment of a larger system and thus starting in mid-stream with a terminology which is totally unfamiliar, the essay contains some of Hegel's most detailed reflections on political and social thought before the *Philosophy of Right*. Knox and Harris have produced a translation to which even those who are familiar with the German text will have to turn. Carefully rendered, abundantly noted and provided with a superb index, the volume is prefaced by a lengthy interpretation of the essay by Harris. At first glance ninety-eight pages may seem a remarkable act of self-indulgence on the part of the editor and translator. But it is only those who have not tried their sanity against this most cryptic of essays who will begrudge Harris his offer of help.

Harris has a clear sense of what one needs to know to make sense out of Hegel's argument and has not shirked from providing it. Beginning with a discussion of the state of the Hegel-Schelling "identity philosophy" at the time of the writing of the *System der Sittlichkeit*, Harris provides an elucidation of the difficult terminology the work employs and the not always clarified presuppositions upon which the work rests. While the *System der Sittlichkeit* is hardly unfamiliar, having been discussed by Marcuse, Plant, Lukács, and Avineri in their studies of Hegel's political writings, Harris is one of the first commentators in English to go beyond the by now rather tiring game of picking out those passages where Hegel "anticipates" Marx and actually try to make sense out of what Hegel is saying on his own terms. The central point of the interpretation lies in demonstrating the significance which such notions as "Potenz" and "Indifference Points" have within Hegel and Schelling's identity philosophy, thus elucidating the structure on which the three parts of the manuscript hang. To turn the *System der Sittlichkeit* into either an anticipation of Marx or a dry run for Hegel's own *Philosophy of Right* is to misunderstand the radically different methodological and ontological basis on which it rested. Here we do not have a dialectical progression of the sort which one meets in the *Philosophy of Right*; we do not have a series of forms in which a concept (in the case of the *Philosophy of Right*, "will") manifests itself until it at last finds an adequate form. Rather, the organization of the *System der Sittlichkeit* is curiously static, *Potenzen* representing those "levels" on which a Spinozistic whole reproduces itself without ever dividing or parcelling itself out, while "Indifference Points" represent the moments at which a sort of balance is obtained between a fluctuation of alternatives which still owes more to Kant's antinomies than to Hegel's dialectic.

Harris' translation of the first Jena *Philosophy of Spirit*, the last third of the manuscript contained in Volume VI of the *Gesammelte Werke*, is of a similarly high quality, although here the decision has been made not to try to duplicate the accuracy (and hence ambiguity) of the critical edition but rather to produce a more readable text that Harris flatly terms "An Interpretation." Some questions may be raised as to why Harris, if interested in producing a more coherent text, did not turn to translating the second Jena *Philosophy of Spirit* (1805-1806), which is a good deal more coherent.

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worked out, and, when all is said, probably a more compelling presentation of Hegel's views on politics and society.\textsuperscript{7} The ultimate value of the first Philosophy of Spirit may lie in its very incoherence: it betrays the titanic struggle in which Hegel was engaged as he began to realize that there was a different and in many ways simpler manner in which he could present his argument, a manner that ran against the organizing principles of identity philosophy.

Less needs to be said about Harris' collaboration with Walter Cerf on two translations of earlier published works: the so-called "Difference" essay (life is much too short to trott out its full title) and the long 1802 article from the Critical Journal, "Faith and Knowledge."\textsuperscript{8} Both are significant works, throwing a good deal of light on Hegel's first embracing and further elaboration of Schelling's standpoint. The former, perhaps best known for its powerful introductory section on the "Need of Philosophy" — Hegel's earliest reflection on the relation between philosophy and the cultural milieu in which it appears — includes Hegel's most concise elaboration of what he takes to be the basic achievement of Schelling's system, which, if not the point of departure for his own philosophy, is at least the philosophical system closest to him at the start of his intellectual journey. "Faith and Knowledge" pushes the criticism of Kant and Fichte first posed in the "Difference" essay even further and sets the stage for the resolution of the breach between philosophical knowledge and religious faith that is one of the primary motifs of the Phenomenology. Both essays provide us, then, with an insight into the first steps Hegel took in displacing his theologico-politico project onto the domain of systematic philosophy.

One can find a link between the Jena writings and what lay before simply because Hegel drew it for us. In September of 1800 — shortly before writing Schelling that well-known letter in which he announces that, having been forced to cast the ideal of his youth in the form of a systematic philosophy, he is now wondering how it is possible to return to an intervention in the lives of men — Hegel wrote a new introduction to the abandoned "Positivity" essay. In addition to suggesting a new definition of positivity that now encompasses Kant as well as Storr, Hegel notes that it is "obvious" that an examination of the way in which the relation between God and man has been posed within the evolution of Christianity "cannot be thoughtfully and thoroughly pursued without becoming in the end a metaphysical treatment of the relation between the finite and the infinite." Somewhat hastily he assures the reader, "But that is not the aim of this essay..."\textsuperscript{9} but it is assuredly a problem which occupies pride of place six months later in the "Difference" essay. There, in his discussion of the way in which reflection has become the main instrument of contemporary philosophizing, we find the philosophical rewrite of the problem that had been plaguing him in Frankfurt: all philosophies that rely on reflection in their effort to reach the absolute become ensnarled in a set of contradictions that force the reflective intellect (Verstand) either to supplement continually its limited truths to encompass more and more of a reality that is grasped only as an infinite task, or to attempt a reflective apprehension of this infinite task, which immediately results in the fixing of the opposition of finite and infinite in a way

\textsuperscript{7} A translation of this text, undertaken by Leo Rauch, will be published by Yale University Press.


that nullifies the significance of the finite intellect's strivings (Diff., 93).

The contradiction into which reflection enters here can best be understood as but one specific case of the more general problem of the way in which philosophy emerges as a result of tensions within a culture. Hegel's discussion of the "Need of Philosophy" in the "Difference" essay thus provides us with both a striking example of the way in which his theologico-politico project was recast and with a means of understanding the practical significance he saw in the critique of philosophy that was launched at Jena. Hegel argued that the need for philosophy arose "When the might of union vanishes from the life of men and the antitheses lose their living connection and reciprocity and gain independence" (Diff., 91). The evolution of Bildung — culture or education (Harris renders the term consistently as the former and curiously translates Kultur as civilization) — takes the form of a constant splitting up of the basic unity of the absolute and a fixing of a given aspect in opposition to the rest of the absolute.10 The forward evolution of Bildung thus has generated such oppositions as "Reason and sensibility, intelligence and nature and...absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity" (Diff., 90). With the advance of Bildung the power of dichotomy becomes ever stronger, and in the present age takes its ultimate form with the turning of Verstand against Vernunft and the subsequent enthroning of reflective Verstand as reason itself (Diff., 92). Hence, Hegel argues that to talk of "grounding" or of finding bases for philosophy within philosophy itself (the program demanded by Reinhold, that bit of "contemporary flotsam in time's stream" who serves as the point of departure for Hegel's reflections) is to be confused both about the very possibility of providing some sort of Grundsatz within a philosophical system (Diff., 103-106) and to ignore the fact that the process of "founding and grounding gets going before, and outside, of philosophy" in the diremptions brought about by the process of Bildung itself (Diff., 93-94).

Thus, if we are to speak of "presuppositions" for philosophy, they must be posed in terms of "the need which has come to utterance" and are two-fold: (1) that the goal sought by philosophy, the Absolute itself, must already be present, since otherwise it would not be sought, and (2) that consciousness "has stepped out of the totality" and thus provides us with a point of access to the Absolute. In Hegel's metaphor, which returns in various guises throughout the Jena period, "The Absolute is night, and the light is younger than it..." (Diff., 93). Common human understanding grasps only this second aspect, and although on the level of "feeling" it still contains an intimation of the Absolute, it remains a process in which single items are isolated which, like "points of light that arise out of the night of totality," serve as guides for everyday activities (Diff., 98-100). Faith, in contrast, grasps the Absolute but in the process nullifies consciousness (Diff., 100). It represents a problematic attempt to restore some measure of unity to the various dichotomies unfolded by Bildung, but at the price of extinguishing the intellect itself. In the words of the Preface to the "Difference" essay, in which Hegel is already glancing at the theme of "Faith and Knowledge," phenomena such as Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion represent the "need for a philosophy that will recompense nature for the mishandling that it suffered in Kant and Fichte's systems" (Diff., 83).

The task of speculation, then, is to construct "conscious identity out of what, in the consciousness of the ordinary intellect, are necessary opposites" and thus provide a synthesis which is an "abomination to faith" (Diff., 100). Even as a failed system,
speculation at least serves to heighten the dichotomies of Bildung and thus to bring them more forcefully to the fore as dichotomies in need of unification (Diff., 102). The goal, then, is to unite what Bildung and a "culture of reflection" have divided, and in this task one cannot proceed by means of reflection, which has as its result only the elaboration of a manifold of particulars in opposition to one another and to the Absolute. Rather, "philosophy must aim to posit this manifold as internally connected, and there necessarily arises the need to produce a totality of knowing, a system of science. As a result, the manifold of these connections finally frees itself from contingency: they get their places in the context of the objective totality of knowledge and their objective completeness is accomplished" (Diff., 113). The "metaphysical" reposing of the problem of positivity thus leads us to Hegel's embracing of systematic philosophy.

Having at least some sense of the general motive for Hegel's immersion in the various system drafts of the Jena years, the problem becomes that of ascertaining what sort of system Hegel has opted for. Here we may move to a brief consideration of two interpretations of Hegel's activity during the Jena period, each of which proceeds from a different end of the period and constructs a different reading of what are the aspirations and lacunae of the Jena years. Harris' extensive introductions to the "Difference" essay, "Faith and Knowledge," and the System der Sittlichkeit in effect provide us with a 200-page discussion of Hegel's early Jena system which takes its point of departure from the sketch of identity philosophy elaborated at the end of the "Difference" essay. From the other end of the Jena period, Otto Poggeler has been led into a discussion of the transformations of the Jena years out of an interest in clarifying the motivations for the framing of a "Science of the Experience of Consciousness," subsequently recast as a Phenomenology of Spirit.

Of Harris' three introductions, it is the one that prefaces his translation of the "Difference" essay that will bear the greatest scrutiny here, just as he draws heavily on its conclusions in his interpretation of the System der Sittlichkeit. In drawing out the implications of Hegel's call for a speculative philosophy that will overcome the limits of reflection by elaborating a coherently interconnected system, Harris relies on the account of Schelling's system that forms the penultimate section of the "Difference" essay. Schelling here is depicted as having found a way around the hypostatization of one aspect of the Absolute that is the cardinal sin of reflection. Unlike Fichte, whose philosophy fails to attain an identity of subject and object and instead is merely the elaboration of a subject-object unity that remains essentially subjective — present in consciousness but not in nature — Schelling's system incorporates both the "subjective subject-object" of Fichte's transcendental philosophy and an "objective subject-object" in the form of a philosophy of nature (Harris, Diff. Intro. 41-42; Diff. 155-161). Seeking to unravel the dichotomy of freedom and necessity that plagues Fichte's practical philosophy and that is overcome only by posing the overcoming of heteronomy as an "ought," Schelling sought to draw out the implications of Kant's analysis of teleology in the Critique of Judgment. But unlike Kant, who posed the notion of a natural end as a regulative idea of knowledge, Schelling interpreted this teleology as constitutive (Harris, System Intro. 14).

The result of this complementing of transcendental philosophy with a science of nature was a system of philosophy that Hegel elaborates in his discussion of Schelling as follows: transcendental philosophy, or as Hegel prefers to call it, the "science of intelligence," maintains the primacy of subject over nature, while the philosophy of nature maintains the dominance of nature over the subject. To that extent one can denote the former as the sphere of practical philosophy, and the latter as the sphere of
theoretical philosophy (Diff. 168). However, if the matter is pushed further it becomes apparent that since both of these sciences are exploring the way in which a subject-object differentiates itself into various domains, each science will have both a theoretical and a practical part. Hence, within the philosophy of nature, there is, in Harris' words, "a tension between the theoretical 'construction' of inorganic nature and the practical 'reconstruction of the organism,' " while within practical philosophy there is a similar tension between "the 'construction' of consciousness itself as the capacity for theoretical cognition" on the one hand and "a fully practical part which deals with the transformation of the natural world through the realization of consciousness" (Harris, Diff. Intro., 50) on the other.

These two sciences are completed by a third phase of the identity system which sets forth the Absolute shared by the science of intelligence and the science of nature. This takes the form of the so-called "resumption" of the whole in art and religion. To understand the task of this final phase, some of the terminology of the system as a whole must be elaborated. Central to the entire undertaking was the notion of Potenz, literally "power" in the sense of mathematical computation. Faced with the question of how an absolute totality can be developed and elaborated into various less-than-Absolute entities without falling into diremption or one-sided reflection, Schelling argued that "since the one being is indivisible, diversity of things is only possible at all, insofar as it is posited as the undivided whole under distinct determinations." These determinations, termed Potenzen, "change nothing whatsoever in the essential being, which remains always and necessarily the same...." The absolute point of identity for the system is that "point of indifference" which comprehends all Potenzen, and conversely also obtains within each individual Potenz. Thus, the construction of the entire system resembles a maddening process of balancing oppositions around null points within both the system as a whole — at the point where art and religion develop an absolute identity — and within the various individual sciences, each of which will be seen as a balance, homologous to the balance of the whole, between freedom and necessity, subject and object, nature and intelligence.

From this follows the often bewildering argument of the System der Sittlichkeit. For the present we need only be concerned with the general form of Harris' interpretation since it gives a more specific case of how one of the individual sciences is organized according to the dictates of identity philosophy. Harris argues that the first part of the essay must be viewed as the working out of the movement from "necessity" to "freedom": from feelings embedded in man's material life to the family, the highest community possible within the realm of feeling. The third section of the essay runs in the opposite direction, from an abstract form of contractual unity to a more differentiated, representative political order. At the null point between these two movements is a remarkable section entitled "The Negative or Freedom or Transgression" which runs through the various forms of destruction (from barbaric invasion to the grudging acceptance of an enemy one cannot defeat) which can befall a social order. Corresponding roughly to the final resumption of the system as a whole is a discussion of religion, missing from the manuscript but possible to reconstruct on the basis of Karl Rosenkranz's account, in which many of the themes of the theological writings are posed once again (Harris, System Intro. 19-20).12

11. Schelling, Philosophy of Art quoted in Harris, Diff. Introduction, pp. 53-54.
The virtues of Harris' approach to the *System der Sittlichkeit* should be evident. Here at last we have a discussion of it which talks about the structure of the argument itself and not about how much the commentator may be reminded of passages in Marx as he plows through a text which is obviously otherwise unintelligible. Armed with this general way of schematizing Hegel's argument, we can understand why certain themes seem to be repeated in various sections — for instance, the discussion of the labor process is broken up and assigned to a number of different Potenzen within the essay. And in those cases when Hegel is less than clear or where the manuscript is clearly lacking elaboration, we can come to some informed guesses about what Hegel was trying to do.

The shortcomings of the interpretation may be less obvious, especially since it is so far above anything that has been ventured in English to date. However, the effort to reconstruct Hegel's early system on the basis of his account of Schelling's system is not unproblematic. Indeed, an attempt to carry out an argument quite similar to Harris' for the entire period from 1800 to 1804, Heinz Kimmerle's *Das Problem der Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens*, has been severely criticized by Rolf P. Horstmann. 13 A few of Horstmann's points bear repeating since they are also applicable to Harris' interpretation. Horstmann's general argument is that there is no compelling reason to feel that Hegel was doing anything more in the penultimate chapter of the "Difference" essay than the section title suggests: carrying out a "Comparison of Schelling's Principle of Philosophy with Fichte's." While it is doubtless true that Hegel's account of Schelling's system is in many ways a development and elaboration of points which Schelling himself had scarcely worked out, and while it is also true that Hegel's association with Schelling should not be viewed, as it is so often by Lukacs, as a temporary fad which Hegel finally abandoned, there is a difference between the account of Schelling's system which Harris takes as Hegel's own and other evidence that exists about Hegel's own system of philosophy.

Horstmann develops two main points against the reading of Hegel's system elaborated by Kimmerle: first, it fails to take note of a different account of the nature of the Absolute in a contemporary published writing, the essay on natural law, and second, it cannot account for the curious role played by Logic and Metaphysics in Hegel's early system. With regard to the first point, Horstmann's case is as follows. Within the Natural Law essay one finds a condensed account of the nature of the Absolute and the relation of theoretical and practical sciences to this Absolute, which is "irreconcilable with that brought forth in the 'Difference' essay..." (95). Hegel here works from the opposition of unity and multiplicity to show that both categories are dependent on each other and remain in his terminology "ideal," and hence simply different modes in which a unity between unity and multiplicity is posited. From this is developed a schema of Natur and Sittlichkeit, which Natural Law expresses in terms of a distinction between the relation of "indifference" (the condition of mutual nullification) with "relation" (the condition of opposition). Hence, the Absolute is viewed as manifesting itself in one of two forms of appearance: as physical nature, in which one has a unity of indifference and relation in which multiplicity is primary (which Hegel terms a "relative identity") and a unity of indifference and relation in which unity is primary: ethical nature (Natural Law, 73). What Horstmann sees as most important about this way of proceeding is that it allows for only two types of

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13. R.P. Horstmann, "Probleme der Wandlung in Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeption," in *Philosophische Rundschau*, 19 (1972), pp. 87-118. Further citations to this essay will be made in the text.
specialized sciences: a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of Sittlichkeit. It does not, in his view, provide the basis or, for that matter, even the need for a third science, a science of the absolute which would "resume" the two sciences at a higher level (96).

Second, Horstmann argues that Kimmerle does not explain adequately the role played by a discipline denoted as "Logic and Metaphysics" in Hegel's early system. In his course announcement for the Summer 1802 session, Hegel speaks of a discipline called Logicam et Metaphysicam sive systema reflexionis rationis." Working on the basis of the discussion at the start of the "Difference" essay, we can understand the sense in which Hegel uses the term logic and why he sets it off from the metaphysics only if we divorce all associations with the Nürnberg Science of Logic from our minds. In 1802, logic served as an introduction to the entire system. Its task seems to have been to articulate the limitations that reflection encounters and hence, as the "Difference" essay argues, prepare the way for speculative philosophy. Thus Horstmann locates the true innovation of Hegel's early Jena system here, at the very start of the "Difference" essay, rather than in the explanation of Schelling's system. The function of logic was to provide a path that reflection could take until it was ready to enter into speculative philosophy, or in the terminology used here, metaphysics. At that point one could begin from the identity equation which stands at the start of systematic philosophy and then work one's way outward, developing the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Sittlichkeit.

It should be apparent that there is a curious kinship between the Phenomenology and this early Logic: both have as their task the raising of naive consciousness to the level where truly philosophical thought can begin, and both begin by exploiting the tendency of reflective thought to fall into an endless series of quandaries which eventually force it to suspend itself. This relationship, sketched by Horstmann in his critique of Kimmerle, has been developed more generally in Otto Poggeler's 1964 essay, "Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeption." While the essay has to some extent been supplanted by subsequent, more detailed studies of the period, it still remains one of the more forceful and lucid elaborations of the path that led Hegel to the Phenomenology, and its translation into English, like that of most of the other essays in his collection, would be a most welcome event.

In Poggeler's reading, an attempt to understand the basic motivation for the Phenomenology must begin with the "Difference" essay and with that bit of flotsam attacked therein, K.L. Reinhold. Reinhold was, in the early years of the new century, one of the staunchest critics of the line of development of Kantian critical philosophy that led to Fichte and Schelling. He viewed the end result of this development as an unmitigated dogmatism, the elaboration of a system of philosophy that could not escape from the "magic circle" of idealism but which remained trapped within its own eternal self-reproduction, totally oblivious to any reality "outside" the circle. From critical philosophy he turned to C.G. Bardili's Logic, and hailed it as the sort of philosophizing that was needed: a methodological attempt to ground the reality of cognition in some sort of fundamental proposition and then, working outward from this, to deduce a comprehensive logical structure that would be grounded in reality.

Hegel, even though he rejected the solution that Reinhold offered and was rather merciless in his treatment of the poor fellow in the "Difference" essay, proved not to take the problem that Reinhold had pointed out quite so cavalierly as the criticism in the "Difference" essay might suggest. Poggeler argues that as early as the account of

the "Difference" essay, there are premonitions of the later criticism of Schelling: that Schelling in effect has done no more than to juxtapose mechanically an "objective subject-object" to the subjective subject-object which Fichte had provided. That the juxtaposition was external and not adequately worked out is suggested by the necessity of a post-factum "resumption" of the two systems in the science of the Absolute. Pöggeler concludes, "That Hegel placed a logic and metaphysics at the start of the system is the fundamental critique of Schelling; a lifting up, a systematic unfolding of the speculative, which was not evolved for itself in Schelling's system — of this need Schelling had no consciousness" (144). Hegel's decisive contribution was thus to bring idealism to consciousness of its own peculiar task: to provide for a systematic elaboration of all its categories (145).

Hegel's subsequent carrying out of this project forced a much more complete break with Schelling than could have been predicted when Hegel first began working out the consequences of this different approach to the Absolute. The first mutation occurs by the time of the Jena Logic and Metaphysics of 1804-1805 (Gesammelte Werke Vol. 7). It has now become difficult to make a clear differentiation between logic and metaphysics since it has become evident that the entire structure of reflection itself already rests on a speculative basis. By 1806 Hegel has dropped the double title to this section of the system and refers to it simply as Logic, and logic is now said to begin within the realm of the speculative rather than within reflection. But this move leaves Hegel without a propaedeutic.

To understand how it is that a "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" comes to play this role, we must examine a related series of transformations which occur within the study of Sittliche Natur and which eventually forced Hegel to frame an authentic Philosophie des Geistes. As early as the Natural Law essay and the System der Sittlichkeit it is apparent that sittliche Natur had one decisive advantage over physiche Natur: it was capable of bringing about, through the political order, a form of reality that is adequate to its content in a self-conscious fashion. Unlike nature, which strives to realize itself in the organism through an unconscious teleology, the ethical realm is a realm of self-conscious action. It is for this reason that Harris' reading of the System der Sittlichkeit may disguise an important tension. His translation includes Karl Rosenkranz's account of the conclusion of the lectures on Sittlichkeit which Hegel offered: here Hegel touches on the themes of folk religion, a constant concern since his Tübingen days. Harris presumes this material would have to be taken up again in the science of the Absolute, thus filling out the Schellingesque scheme of the last part of the "Difference" essay (Harris, System Intro. 81-85). But, in the absence of any manuscript materials indicating that Hegel in fact was working on or planned to work on a science of the Absolute, a more interesting conjecture is possible, and has been advanced rather cogently by Horstmann: Why assume that Hegel ever intended to frame a science of the Absolute? Having developed the basic speculative principle in his Metaphysics, what would be the need for a resumption at the end? And if this is true, could not the concluding portions of the System der Sittlichkeit be seen as a working out of the dictum from the Natural Law essay that "Geist is higher than nature" by showing how it is first within the domain of Sittlichkeit that one comes to the elaboration of the Absolute?

There remain some ambiguities to be worked out within the domain of the science of Sittlichkeit before it can become, properly speaking, a Philosophy of Spirit. The Jena manuscripts from 1803-1804 should not, in Horstmann's view, be called a Philosophy of Spirit since here Geist and consciousness are both introduced as
determinants of *Sittlichkeit*. We do not yet see an immanent development of absolute *Geist* out of the structure of self-consciousness. This had to await the 1805-1806 cycle where for the first time one sees an embracing of what Hegel was to term in a notebook from the period "Fichte's contribution": "First through the history of consciousness one knows what one has in these abstractions, through the concept...". The structure of consciousness thus provides philosophy with a series of self-moving concepts: we have thus arrived at the decisive principle of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Horstmann 110-117).

Present-day commentators have held the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in considerably higher esteem than its first readers or, for that matter, the author himself. The book was scarcely published before he began to criticize it. To Schelling, in the well-known letter of May 1, 1807, he complained that a "wretched confusion" (*unselige Verwirrung*) had infected not only the publishing, printing and distribution of copies, but even the composition of the book itself. "I am curious what you will say about the idea of this first part, which is really an introduction — for I have still not gotten beyond the introducing, *in medium rem.* — The working out of the details has, I feel, harmed the overview of the whole, which itself, because of its nature, is such an interlacing of hither and thither, that even if it had been better carried out, would still cost me too much time until it stood clearer and more complete." And noting the "greater lack of form" (*grossere Unform*) of the latter parts, he excused himself by reminding Schelling that he "finished the editing around midnight, before the Battle of Jena" (*Briefe* 1: 161-162). In other letters he expressed hopes that a second edition might enable him to clarify the organization of the book, but when he finally came to prepare a new edition of the work, shortly before his death, he labelled it "A curious early work, not revised — related to the time of its composition — in the Preface: the abstract *Absolute* dominated at the time." 16

This time-boundness of the work seems to have been conveyed to Hegel's students, who used the term "phenomenology" to denote those systems that remained trapped at the level of "consciousness" with its separation of subject and object and thus did not make the advance to true philosophical speculation. Rosenkranz's biography, while more sympathetic to the work, sealed its fate: it was a product of Hegel's break with Schelling and Fichte and while it did, with the attainment of the concept of *Geist*, provide the appropriate philosophizing subject, it did not, as was the case in the *Logic*, provide a system. Others, such as Rudolph Haym, were more hostile. He viewed it as a mishmash of transcendental philosophy and history that "cannot be what it should be and is not what it wants to be." Of the early commentators on the *Phenomenology* only David Friedrich Strauss took a more tolerant stance, preferring the more open approach of the not-yet *unwiderlegte Weltphilosoph* to the more systematic utterances of the sage of Berlin. It was Straus's comments that gave Marx his point of entry into the work, and in the context of the book's initial reception, the care that Marx devoted to the critique of the work in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* is indeed unique.17

The confusion prompted by the disorder of the work itself was only compounded by Hegel's subsequent treatment of it. Originally conceived as the first part of a "System of Science" which Hegel hoped to complete over the summer of 1806, some of the first

17. For general discussions of the reception of the *Phenomenology* see Pöggeler, pp. 170-188 and the forward to Hans Friedrich Fulda and Dieter Henrich, eds., *Materialien zu Hegels 'Phänomenologie des Geistes'* (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 14-23.
editions of the work actually carry the original title page, which reads “System of Science: First Part, the Science of the Experience of Consciousness.” But while the book was still in the publisher’s hands, Hegel changed the title page to read “I. Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit,” a request that was not carried out in all extant copies of the first edition. Some continued to carry the first title; others carried both.18 The Preface to the first edition of the Science of Logic still claimed that the Phenomenology was the first part of the System of Science, the Logic the second, and the yet-to-be-published two concrete sciences, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit, the completion of the system. But in an 1831 footnote, Hegel stated that this system had now been replaced by the 1817 Encyclopedia and announced that in the new edition of the Phenomenology the old title, “System of Science: First Part” would be dropped.19 The lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, however, still seem to leave an opening for the Phenomenology even within the completed Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.20

The most damning later discussion of the book occurs in the Encyclopedia itself, where, in the conclusion of the discussion of the “Preliminary Concept,” Hegel explained the confusion inherent in the Phenomenology in a way that was to greatly influence subsequent discussions of the work. In distinguishing the method of introducing naive consciousness to philosophy that was undertaken in the Encyclopedia’s discussion of the three attitudes toward objectivity from that taken in the Phenomenology itself, Hegel writes, “In my Phenomenology of Spirit... the method adopted was to begin with the first and simplest phase of mind, immediate consciousness, and to show how that stage gradually of necessity worked onward to the philosophical point of view, the necessity of that view being proved by the process. But in these circumstances it was impossible to restrict the quest to the mere form of consciousness. For the stage of philosophical knowledge is the richest in material and organization, and therefore, as it came before us in the shape of a result, it presupposed the existence of the concrete formations of consciousness, such as the individual social morality, art and religion. In the development of consciousness, which at first sight appears limited to the point of form merely, there is thus at the same time included the development of matter or of the objects discussed in the special branches of philosophy.”21 Thus, the propaedeutic task of the Phenomenology would seem, in the Encyclopedia, to be given over to the introductory discussion of the attitudes towards objectivity, while Phenomenology itself, restricted now to a discussion of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason, survives within the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit as a science of consciousness which carries out the transition from anthropology, a science which observes spirit while still immersed in nature, to psychology, a discipline that deals with Spirit proper. Hence the feeling that the Phenomenology of 1807 was somehow a mishmash of history and transcendental philosophy did not have to wait for Haym to be expressed. On the basis of Hegel’s own treatment, one wonders if the work in fact had a coherent structure.

This state of affairs has given rise to a debate over whether there is a fundamental break within the Phenomenology, a break that, in Werner Marx’s way of posing the problem, would in fact separate the two different titles given to the work by Hegel.

On the one hand, we have the authentic "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" running up to and including the discussion of Reason, a science that was later inserted into the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. On the other hand we have a "Phenomenology of Spirit," an ambitious work that seeks to unfold the entire content of the system of philosophy, beginning with naive consciousness, proceeding through the domain of "Objective Spirit" with its discussions of politics and culture, and culminating in an entry into what will subsequently be the triad of "Absolute Spirit": art, religion and philosophy. Read in this way the Phenomenology would not simply be an introduction to philosophy which leads one to the door of the Logic; rather, the "authentic science of the spirit" with which the Phenomenology is claimed to "coincide" is the entire Philosophy of Spirit itself.

In the face of the general reputation of the work in modern discussions it is perhaps helpful to begin an examination of the problems of the coherence of the Phenomenology with what must be the most blunt statement of the case for the prosecution yet available in English — Michael Petry's introduction to his new edition of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. The book itself shows the same care that Petry lavished on his edition of the Philosophy of Nature. Respect is paid to Hegel's considerable immersion in the empirical sciences of his day by tracing the references, taken from Hegel's unpublished lecture notes, to contemporary works in anthropology and psychology and by explaining what empirical basis Hegel's systematic reconstruction had in the sciences of his own day. Hegel's discussion of anthropology, phenomenology and psychology from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences and the introduction to the entire Philosophy of Spirit (in other works, paragraphs 377-482 of the third edition of the Encyclopaedia) are offered in a new translation with the German text on facing pages. Through the use of bold-faced type, those portions of the text that date from 1827 or 1830 are distinguished from that part of the text that was carried over unchanged from the first edition of 1817. Petry uses the Boumann 1845 edition of the Encyclopaedia as the basis for the German text, and thus provides a translation of Boumann's Zusätzte. But his edition goes beyond the Wallace-Miller translation by also translating additional parts of the lecture transcripts from which Boumann drew his Zusätzte, and by translating Hegel's dictations to his class. Finally, Petry has translated some material which was previously unavailable in any edition: an 1822-1825 reworking of the early sections of the Philosophy of Spirit, apparently undertaken by Hegel with the intent of publishing something equivalent to the Philosophy of Right with respect to the section of his lectures on subjective spirit, and the complete text of Griesheim's notes on Hegel's 1825 lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Petry's long introduction expresses a heretical preference for the Encyclopaedia's version of phenomenology over the 1807 Phenomenology, and argues that it is within the domain of psychology rather than phenomenology that Hegel made his most important breakthrough. Petry's immersion in the more concrete side of Hegel's

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23. Phenomenology, p. 58; this interpretation was advanced by Otto Pöggeler in a 1961 essay "Zur Deutung der Phänomenologie des Geistes" now in Hegel's Idea... op.cit., pp. 211-214. The interpretation has subsequently been revised. See "Hegels Phänomenologie des Selbstbewusstseins" in ibid., pp. 262-263 and "Die Komposition des Phänomenologie des Geistes," in Fulda and Henrich, Materialien... op.cit., p. 351.

system stems from his feeling that "By concentrating upon the Phenomenology, the Logic and what they thought were the general principles of the mature system... the supposedly orthodox exponents of Hegelianism during the 1830s and 1840s laid themselves wide open to the one-sided by incisively constructive criticism of Feuerbach and Marx" (xiii-xiv). If Hegel's reflections on politics are not to be merely a "parenthesis within the Logic," then it is not enough to understand how the structural arrangement of the Philosophy of Right corresponds to the Logic. Rather, one must see how the category of will, so crucial to all of the subsequent Philosophy of Spirit, is first elaborated within the psychology (xxi-xxii, xlv-xlvi).

Petry is considerably less enthusiastic about the Phenomenology. To use it as an introduction for students to the system as a whole is "to run the risk of their never finding a way out of the subject-object problems raised, it being so much easier to fossick around in epistemology than to get down to the hard grind of mastering empirical disciplines" (lxxxi). To argue that it marks a decisive phase in the evolution of Hegel's thought is to ignore the fact that Hegel was a systematic philosopher before and after the Phenomenology and although there are differences between the Jena systems and the Berlin system "it is difficult to see how many of them relate in any way whatever to what was accomplished in the Phenomenology" (lxviii). Its value consists almost entirely in providing a critique of Kantian and Fichtean approaches to philosophy. "Had Hegel been in as full a command of the Philosophy of Spirit as he was when lecturing upon the Encyclopaedia," Petry claims, "the treatment of consciousness, the Phenomenology proper, would have been concluded with the discussion of the identity of thinghood and reason" (lxx). Thus, like Haering, who in 1933 argued that the Phenomenology of 1807 was in fact a palimpsest that should have concluded with the section on reason, and in fact returns to its original form... the Nurnberg lectures.²⁵ Petry sees the primary accomplishment of the Phenomenology as being the overcoming of the antimony of subject and object, an antimony that is resolved long before the book itself grinds to a halt.

There are clearly problems with Petry's approach, however enlightening it is to see someone finally damn the monster rather than praise it, warts and all. The simplest problem lies at the very point of contact with Haering's thesis: the notion that somehow the abbreviated Phenomenology of Heidelberg and Berlin, already present in the Nurnberg lecture notes, represents the core of the 1807 work. and that Hegel was quick to realize this. The problem with this interpretation is that the philological evidence for it is questionable. Petry still relies on Hoffmeister's edition of the Nurnberg lectures, while Otto Pöggeler, in his critique of Haering's thesis in his 1961 article "Zur Deutung der Phänomenologie des Geistes" (now in Hegel's Idee...), had indicated that Hoffmeister's edition of the Bewusstseinlehre für die Mittelklasse of 1808-1809 (the so-called "Harvard Manuscript") misreads certain crucial marginal notations and obscures the fact that it was Hegel's original intention to lecture on the entire Phenomenology, dividing it into three sections: A) The consciousness of abstract objects (Ch. I-IV of the 1807 Phenomenology), B) The consciousness of the world of finite spirit (Ch. VI), and C) Consciousness of Absolute Spirit (Ch. VII-VIII).²⁶ However, Hegel's students apparently could not follow him, and the ambitious plan of lecturing on the entire Phenomenology was abandoned.²⁷ Hence at

²⁶. These changes have been incorporated into the Suhrkamp edition of the Nurnberg writings. See Werke in Zwanzig Bänden, op.cit., vol. 4, pp. 71, 74, 611.
least down to 1808 Hegel saw enough merit in the complete Phenomenology to attempt a journey through it with his students.

It is, of course, possible to place aside the question of whether there was an Urphantomenologie that ended with the chapter on reason, and instead simply argue that the work is more coherent if read in the shortened form. This indeed is the main thrust of Petry's argument. A response to this sort of objection must show whether in fact anything is to be gained by dragging the Phenomenology as a study of the “experience of consciousness” out into a full blown “Phenomenology of Spirit” dealing with matters which might more tidily be left to the study of the Objective and Absolute Spirit. Werner Marx's 1971 book, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is now the most readily accessible case for arguing that indeed there is a coherence to the work as a whole. At first glance his study appears rather unpromising: yet another commentary on the methodological statements which open the Phenomenology, it sidesteps the more difficult task of explaining, at any given moment within Hegel's argument, what exactly is going on. Furthermore, the book is best understood against the background of a series of German discussions by Pöggeler, Hans Friedrich Fulda, Rüdiger Bubner, and Gadamer; with only the latter in English it seems unlikely that many readers will know what Marx is talking about when he begins by stating that "In recent years many of the old questions about the interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit have again been revived" (ix). Neither the initial questions — posed by Haering, Haym, et al — nor the revivals are very well-known to most English-speaking readers.

The merit of the book, however, lies in a discussion of two central methodological problems of the Phenomenology that is lucid and compelling enough to make sense even to those unfamiliar with the considerably more advanced level of German discussion of the Phenomenology. The first problem discussed is that of the relation between the "educational history" of consciousness, advancing from the level of natural consciousness and phenomenal knowledge to that of Absolute knowledge, and the educational history of Geist itself, which is traced in the discussions of cultural forms which make up the bulk of the third section of the Phenomenology. The second main theme of the book, given much less attention, is an examination of the function of the "phenomenologist" himself, the narrative "we" whose introductions and conclusions flank the actual presentations of the movement of consciousness. While neither of these problems has been ignored in existing English-language literature on the Phenomenology, Marx's detailed examination of the way in which these methodological issues are handled in the Preface and Introduction to the Phenomenology is far more rigorous than anything to have appeared to date.

At the heart of the first problem is the issue of the relation of the two parts of the Phenomenology that forever threaten to fall apart: the tracing out of consciousness's path, which proceeds through a series of shapes of consciousness, and the tracing out of the path of Geist itself which involves shapes that are, in Hegel's words, "distinguished from the previous ones by the fact that they are real Spirits, actualities in the strict meaning of the word, and instead of being shapes merely of consciousness, are shapes of a world" (Phenomenology 265). Marx sees the motive for this transition from what has been in effect a "science of the experience of consciousness" to a "Phenomenology of Spirit" proper as resting on Hegel's discussion of the type of education (Bildung) which consciousness must receive. In the Preface, Hegel argues that Bildung moves on two different levels: that of the individual consciousness and

that of the "universal individual, self-conscious spirit." At any given stage the achievements of the universal individual represent the "inorganic nature" on which the individual consciousness rests, and hence the task of education at any point must be the assimilation of this inorganic nature into the consciousness itself. This process of education cannot thus be limited simply to an inventory of the shapes which appear to consciousness in the course of the path of doubt and despair that culminates in the realization, with the section on Reason, that subject and object are in fact one. Rather, a more concrete, historical lesson must be added to that which is learned within the immanent trajectory of consciousness.

The mixing of transcendental philosophy and history which Haym so abhorred thus rests on the important modification Hegel made in Kant's transcendental unity of apperception: it is not simply posited as existing, nor is it simply to be developed in a history of consciousness of the sort outlined by Schelling and Fichte; it evolves historically in the form of ethical nature, i.e., in the domain of objective spirit. Because Hegel has de-centered transcendental subjectivity from the individual consciousness, there is a need to push the path of the deduction of transcendental subjectivity beyond the confines of the chapter on reason. Because individual subjectivity nevertheless rests upon this transcendental subjectivity and indeed partakes of the standpoint achieved by reflection-philosophy now as a prejudice of "natural consciousness," it is possible for the Phenomenology of Spirit to take its point of departure from the "Science of the Experience of Consciousness." Once the relation between consciousness and Geist has been posed in this way it becomes clearer what has been lost in the truncated Phenomenology of the Encyclopedia: the entire historical dimension in which the development of Absolute knowledge has been situated in the Phenomenology. History of course plays a role in the Encyclopedia, but it is a confined role, to be reached by a path that leads from anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology, through most of "Objective Spirit" until finally, after a discussion of the role of the state within the realm of Sittlichkeit, we come to a discussion of "World History" whose contents must struggle against the confines of the place it occupies within the system.

While the motive for the linking of a history of the experience of consciousness with a history of Geist may be clearer by this examination, the question of how successful Hegel was in realizing this goal remains. Such a question can probably not be settled by a methodological examination of the Introduction to the Phenomenology (written before the composition of the bulk of the text) which simply promises us that the experience of consciousness will "comprehend nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, or the entire realm of truth of Spirit," and the Preface, written after the composition, which justifies the shift in the type of shapes that appear in terms of the necessities of education. The burden of proof ultimately falls where Hegel insists it would have to fall in any case, on the arrangement and coherence of the body of the text itself. But there is one further methodological issue whose examination will do much to shed light on the coherence of the text itself: the problem of the contribution made by the phenomenologist who narrates the course taken by consciousness. Marx argues that the function of the phenomenologist is five-fold: "The phenomenologist... is in the first place he who takes phenomenal knowledge along on the road. Secondly, he is the initiator of the movement of the history of experience, and hence also the dialectical history of experience. Thirdly, by means of his superior knowledge, the phenomenologist surveys the dialectical movement of experience and the category of necessity underlying it, which makes possible the exoteric presentation, and hence the justification vis-a-vis natural consciousness. Fourthly, as a result of the foregoing
history of experience, there arises for the phenomenologist the synthesis positively apprehended as principle. Fifthly, he can act as a guide for phenomenal knowledge" (91-92).

The contribution in each of these cases is of a different magnitude. With regard to the first and fourth, the function remains purely narrative and contemplative: the phenomenologist lays out the history that consciousness has taken in a more coherent form, thus elucidating the deeper significance of these events. This much has long been apparent to commentators on the Phenomenology. The second point has been noted by Kenley Dove in an article on Hegel's method that pointed out that the function of the narrative “we” is anything but contemplative in the opening sections of the book.29 Indeed, for there to be a dialectical movement at all, it is necessary for natural consciousness to be forced to place itself in the paradoxes of the first chapter which begin the journey down the path of doubt and despair (Marx, 90). The fifth point, never well developed by Marx, can mean either that the phenomenologist remains in the role of passive observer or, if it turns out that there is a need for further prodding beyond the opening sections of the Phenomenology, plays the more active role of setting up situations in which consciousness can confound itself, a role akin to Emile's tutor, to drag out the ever-popular comparison. For our purposes, however, it is the third of these functions that is most troubling and indeed it is here that Marx's discussion enters into one of the more heavily worked regions of recent Hegel scholarship.

In brief, the problem which many readers of Hegel's account of the experience of consciousness doubtlessly have is that the shifts from one figure of consciousness to another and the lessons learned in the process seem much more necessary and coherent to the narrative “for us” than they do either to the suffering consciousness which is undergoing all this torture or, more significantly, to the suffering reader of the book. That the transitions may not be apparent for consciousness is of little account; the narrative structure of the Phenomenology, with its constant for it-for us oppositions presumes that some discrepancy like this is necessary, otherwise explanations about what is going on would be unnecessary. But, if the accounts which are supposed to hold true “for us” or “in itself” do not ring true to a reader who has endeavored to follow the argument, then a more serious problem arises. The necessity of a transition can obviously not simply be assured by having the narrator of the account tell us that the transition was necessary. The account must in some way be convincing to us. As has been seen in the comments which opened the first installment of this review, it is precisely here that Charles Taylor questions the successfulness of Hegel's account in the Phenomenology. While Hegel, according to Taylor, provides us with an indubitable starting point and gives a strict ontological dialectic in the first three chapters of the book, once he moves beyond self-consciousness, we are left only with an “interpretive or hermeneutical dialectic” which is convincing only on the level of general plausibility, i.e., its ability to provide an account which “fits” (217-218).

Findlay, in his introductory comments to the new translation of the Phenomenology, notices a related problem but is far more sanguine about the consequences. He implies that the possibility of other types of accounts, the looseness which in general characterizes interpretive or hermeneutic accounts, is not fatal to the Phenomenology. “There is no reason to think that Hegel thought that the path traced in the Phenomenology, though consisting throughout of necessary steps, was the only

path that the conscious spirit could have taken in rising from sensuous immediacy to Absolute knowledge. It was the main path that had been taken by the World Spirit in past history.... But this involved no pronouncement as to what pathway to Science would be taken by men in the future.... " Hegel, in brief, does not, in Findlay's view, equate the necessary with the unique (vi).

Since the problem here is considerably broader than a debate about the argument of the Phenomenology itself, it is worth bringing a few of these issues to light, especially since they are taken up in this fashion in Raymond Plant's critique of Hegel's attempts to bring about a reconciliation with reality by showing the necessity of what exists. Plant's immediate target is Frithjof Bergmann's 1964 article, "The Purpose of Hegel's System," which in turn is a critique of the equation of Hegel's notion of necessity with strict logical necessity. Bergmann argues that Hegel has no intention of meaning anything approximating strict "deductive certainty" in his use of the term "necessity." Rather, what Hegel inherits from Fichte is a conception of necessity as "necessary for a purpose," in this case, a general account of what must be the case if there is to be a coherent, harmonious account of an order which is not constituted by thought, but is rather recollected and accounted for by systematic philosophy or science. It does not follow from such an enterprise that there is only one system possible. Indeed, as Petry shows well in his discussion of Hegel's reformulations of the various parts of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Hegel's attitude towards the structural arrangement of the material remained in a good deal of flux and was rarely as bound by the structure of the Logic as is usually supposed. Hence, in Bergmann's view, Hegel's demonstration of the "rationality of the world," his attempt to "prove that it is a process with a purpose" is something which is "impossible to demonstrate.... with a few arguments or to derive.... as a conclusion from several premises. It is the sort of thing that can only be shown, and in order to show it one has to specify the purpose and then indicate in detail how everything contributes to its realization" (200). This, as the reader may have seen, is very close to Taylor's account of the status of Hegel's historical or interpretive dialectics. But the crucial point of Bergmann's argument is that it is wrong to assume that Hegel ever intended to provide an account which had more than the sort of hermeneutic or interpretive plausibility which Taylor maintains is simply not enough.

Plant's critique is most telling at the point which matters most to his argument: the relation between necessity and reconciliation in Hegel's thought. Unfortunately, this is also the point where Bergmann is most cavalier. Pointing to the continuity between Hegel's early explorations of the dichotomies between God and man, and between reason and emotions, Bergmann argues "it is these 'disharmonies' that Hegel tried to resolve in his attempts to go beyond Fichte and to demonstrate the rationality not only of consciousness but of the world. It may seem strange that Hegel thought demonstrating the rationality of the world was a way to achieve this. But one has to remember that for Hegel the word 'reason' still had a magical sound" (196). This clearly won't do, and this explanation of the relation between Hegel's early and later stages is itself a rather "magical" way out of a problem which bears considerably closer investigation. Plant's examination, however, is laden with its own difficulties. At the heart of Plant's critique lies a rather untenable either-or. Either Hegel treats the immanent teleology of consciousness coming to know itself through "natural and social developments" as a "regulative idea" or the "teleology of consciousness... requires some kind of metaphysical justification." Since the teleology of consciousness...
is not a mere regulative idea, as is apparent from Hegel and Schelling’s transformation of Kant’s third critique, Plant is convinced that Hegel’s notion of Spirit or Absolute Idea “is really a metaphysical counterpart of the Christian God” and thus provides the needed grounding for the teleology of consciousness. Since the idea stands in a “creative relationship to the world” it can explain “how the necessary development of consciousness is built into reality and how the philosopher eventually is able to grasp it in its process of development” (132). As evidence for invocations of this “creative relationship” in Hegel’s work, Plant cites passages from the early paragraphs of the Philosophy of Nature, the discussion of the “tragedy of Sittlichkeit” in the Natural Law essay, and the linkage of the process of historical evolution with the rule of God in the Introduction to Reason in History (132-133). One may quibble about the adequacy of this evidence: the Natural Law essay, for instance, was written at a period when Hegel still was under the sway of the Spinozism he shared with Schelling and in any case is being deployed metaphorically to illustrate the concrete fact that the ethical community must give part of itself over to the realm of material labor if it is to survive. But even granting that Hegel does at times speak as if there is a creative and hence metaphysical relation between idea and world, a rather compelling argument may be raised against Plant’s belief that Hegel’s account of necessity rests on this sort of basis.

It is possible to treat such grandiose statements as Klaus Hartmann has proposed in his “non-metaphysical” approach to Hegel’s system. Hartmann suggests that Hegel’s system includes certain “maximal claims” which violate what in fact is the minimal and coherent heart of his system. What is coherent and defensible in Hegel is a “transformation of what is found, or granted as a fact or as a deliverance of science or naive philosophy, into a reconstruction in the form of rational necessity, or in a priori form” (103). In this view, the dispute between Bergmann and Plant is off the mark; we are not faced with a choice between Bergmann’s “necessity for a purpose,” the purpose being a desire to provide a coherent account of the world, and Plant’s metaphysically grounded necessity. Rather, another alternative exists: a system of categories, generated by an architectonic which stretches from “the zero case of categorization (being). . .to the fulfilled case of categorization, where thought categorizes itself as having enclosed all determination (concept).” Guided at each step by the alternative perspectives of being-in-itself and being-for-itself it is possible to carry out a systematic “hermeneutic of rationality” which involves neither metaphysical claims nor indeterminacy in the outlining of the basic categorical structure (104-107).

The merit of Hartmann’s proposal lies in its ability to give coherence to Hegel’s general project while enabling us at the same time to isolate cases where Hegel seems to have overstepped the bounds he has set for himself in the far greater number of cases where he is proceeding rigorously. Significantly, the overstepping occurs in precisely the cases which interest Plant most: at moments when he personifies the Idea of God and gives it a constitutive role to play in the passage from logic to Realphilosophie and when history itself is introduced as a structuring force in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History and in the discussion of Absolute Spirit. A resolution of this discrepancy between Hegel’s systematic achievements and his own

self-understanding of what he was doing, expressed most ambitiously in passages like those just noted, may have to be considerably messier than any of the parties involved might be satisfied with. Hegel's system, considered "for us" or "in itself," can be coherently reconstructed along the lines Hartmann has proposed without metaphysical claims and indeed, *pace* Taylor, may remain an eminently serviceable ontology. Hegel's emphatic and uncharacteristically desperate assertions that somehow having possession of this ontology makes one feel reconciled to reality should not perhaps be taken as the ultimate criteria for judging the success of his project, but they do have considerable value as historical evidence of the concerns which he was never able to integrate into his system. Hence, *pace* Plant, the failure of Hegel's project of reconciliation requires no attempt to patch up his ontology with notions like "loose entailments," since examined on its own terms, the ontology hangs together fairly well. But that is not to claim that, on its own terms, the system can "reconcile" us to reality.

This same tension between a systematically coherent, although somewhat austere project, and considerably more passionate expressions that testify to some unsatisfied practical imperative can be found within the *Phenomenology* itself. Even without accepting Hartmann's "non-metaphysical" reading of the *Logic* it is possible to understand what the *Phenomenology* is trying to accomplish without assuming that it must produce an ascending dialectic that has the sort of ontological certitude that Taylor demands. Objections to the *Phenomenology* that question whether there is not a certain arbitrariness in the path it takes or even defenses of Hegel's arguments that use the metaphor of "branching proofs" of mathematical problems both seem to presume that the purpose of the *Phenomenology* is that of raising naive consciousness to the level at which the *Logic* begins; in short, to move consciousness from one place to another or, in Hegel's metaphor, to give us a ladder that lifts us into the first chapter of the *Logic*. If the ladder could be pointed in a number of different directions, the critic of the *Phenomenology* argues, how can we be sure that we have in fact reached a secure starting point for the deduction of all that is? To which the defender of the *Phenomenology* of the stripe of Findlay or Bergmann would retort: first of all the goal is not to *deduce* everything, but rather to provide a rational account that allows for a good deal of contingency and second of all, it doesn't matter what angle the ladder happens to take, all that is important is that one comes to the goal of absolute knowledge.

While the first of the defender's points is certainly correct, the second point is more questionable, although understandable. The problem lies in the assumption, to be sure encouraged by Hegel, that the point of the *Phenomenology* is to prepare one for a reading of the *Science of Logic*. Despite the fact that few have been able to explain exactly what the *Phenomenology* gives to the reader of the *Science of Logic* that he or she might not have already had before wading into the former, it has been an article of faith, at least until recently, that the *Phenomenology* is some sort of propaedeutic. But what sort? The ladder metaphor is, on second examination, rather dubious here: what can it mean to say that the *Phenomenology* "raises" consciousness to the level of the *Logic*? Beyond the exhilaration (or relief) that one may have with the rush of the last chapter of the *Phenomenology*, what is one supposed to carry from the *Phenomenology* to the *Logic*?

The answer, on the basis of important work of Hans Friedrich Fulda and Johannes Heinrichs, falls into two parts: (1) There is simply nothing that one takes from the

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32. Hans Friedrich Fulda, "Zur Logik der Phänomenologie" in Fulda and Henrich, *op. cit.*
Phenomenology to the Science of Logic, composed in Nürnberg. The goal of the Phenomenology cannot be that specific system of categories. However, if one looks backward through the train of categories generated by the Phenomenology, the outlines of a logic resembling that of the 1804-1805 Jena Logic and Metaphysics becomes apparent. The working out of the specific character of the connection between the Phenomenology and this logic is approached in a different fashion by each, and a closer examination of Fulda’s tightly argued article, let alone Heinrichs’s massive study, would strain this already hefty review to the breaking point. To summarize brutally: the significance of the approach which Fulda has suggested and Heinrichs has to a large measure carried out lies in seeing the Phenomenology not simply as a passage from the level of naive consciousness to the level of scientific consciousness, but rather as an ordered sequence of levels each of which corresponds to some portion of the Logic. To return to the ladder metaphor again, what matters most in this reading is not that one ascends to the level of the Logic. Rather, what is important about the ladder is, as it were, the spacing and organization of the rungs over which one passes. At the end of the ladder one is not at some place which is of particular significance, but one does have, by virtue of the very journey up the ladder, an ordered sequence of categories that can now be re-expressed, no longer in the language of consciousness and object which dominates the Phenomenology, but rather in the pure “ether” of the Logic itself.

Form this perspective, the problem of the necessity of the stages through which one passes takes on a different character. The notion that there can be alternative paths is to some degree sustained, since presumably the specific content of consciousness’s experience could be different. But the logical rigor of the work, the categories that correspond to the various Gestalten of Spirit which the book traces, are not simply contingent. They must parallel in a much more precise way than has usually been assumed the various stages of the logic itself.

What Fulda and Heinrichs have provided then is an approach to the Phenomenology that breaks completely with the assumption, predominant in German Hegel scholarship since Haering, that the unity of the book can only be grasped historically and not logically. To the extent that German Hegel scholarship runs the constant risk of becoming simply Hegel-philology (a state of affairs which, it must be stressed, should not feed the smug satisfaction of the all too many English-speaking commentators who seem to feel that such philological considerations are beneath consideration) the new tack taken by Fulda and Heinrichs is a welcome one. However, it is only fair to allow Pöggeler a rejoinder here, since his objection to Fulda’s line of inquiry, while by no means vitiating the promise of a program which Heinrichs has now made even more apparent, does raise a problem that parallels that which has been noted with respect to Hartmann’s “non-metaphysical” reading of the Logic. If one examines, Pöggeler argues, “how Hegel takes up the religious tradition and seeks to resolve it or also is not able to resolve it with the newly arising emancipated society, it must then appear as absurd, that the Hegelian accomplishment should be nothing other than a clothing of logical moments in figures of consciousness.”

In the face of these sorts of questions Pöggeler holds out for a philologically informed philosophical reconstruction. In reply, Heinrichs suggests that the results

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33. Fulda, op. cit., p. 393.

from Pöggeler to date have been a good deal of simultaneous ja und nein saying (88). This sort of schizophrenia should not be confused with what goes on in the Phenomenology proper, but it may be the standard occupational hazard of those who try to take both the logical claims and the passionate language of the book seriously. I must confess to the bad faith of being persuaded at one and the same time by both Pöggeler and Fulda-Heinrichs. The logical rigor of the book is there, and commentaries that simply repeat the content of the book in simpler form or become embedded in the details of the argument fall prey to the very problem that Hegel said, in his letter to Schelling, had befallen him in the composition of the book: the concept of the book suffers at the price of an elaboration of the content. Equally, if one sees anything of importance in the historical, political and religious studies that precede the Phenomenology, it is impossible to be convinced that he was simply using this material to generate a logical structure. It is not a reduction of philosophy to philology to ask if the minimal logical program that one can take out of the Phenomenology is in fact all that Hegel was trying to accomplish there. Or, if it was all he specifically set out to accomplish, can we simply overlook the painfully obvious fact that his becoming embedded in the details, his overly passionate language, or the political and theological concerns that continually recur in the book seem constantly to be reminding him of more ambitious tasks, temporarily (?) laid to one side while preparing an introduction to the “authentic science of the spirit”?

In an important sense, the exploration of these sorts of problems seems to be best facilitated by the confrontations of philological and systematic work on the Phenomenology that have been the hallmark of recent German Hegel scholarship. Certainly, neither Fulda nor Heinrichs would deny that one of the most significant insights in laying the foundations for the logical reconstruction of the Phenomenology was the understanding of the proper function and dating of the Jena Logic and Metaphysics manuscripts from 1804-1805. Conversely, one might hope that those taking up the non-logical aspects of the Phenomenology, that is, those exploring the ethical, political and religious themes within the Phenomenology, would pay some attention to the systematic function of this material within the Phenomenology itself. It is only this sort of awareness of alternative functions of any given part of the text that will prevent either overly austere logical reconstructions or fast and loose sets of variations on thematic materials ripped willy-nilly from the text.

Commentaries on the political and moral dimensions of the Phenomenology are few in number. The bibliography provided by Fulda and Henrich in their Materialienband notes comparatively little which could be so classified. Whe one does come across an exploration of political or moral themes, all too often it is simply an attempt to show how such general notions as alienation or objectification might be of political import. Indeed, the tendency has been to follow Lukács and reduce the political import of the Phenomenology to an anticipation of Marx’s analysis of structures of alienated labor. What remains virtually ignored in all of this are the detailed explorations of morality, culture and politics that make up the latter half of the book.

Two recent studies are exceptions to this rule: Jonathan Robinson’s Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind35 and Judith N. Shklar’s Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind.36 The former, a study of Hegel’s critique of moral philosophy as found in Chapter VI of

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35. (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
the *Phenomenology* cannot be discussed here, although the work itself can easily be recommended as a clear and lucid discussion of a portion of the *Phenomenology* which should be quite accessible to students of ethics. The latter, which brings together a series of essays written by Shklar over the last decade on themes in Chapters V and VI, is of obvious importance to the concerns of this review — as much by what it fails to accomplish as by what it actually does. The book is conceived as a commentary for "students of political theory, both undergraduate and graduate, who have found Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* incomprehensible and who might, with the help of a guideline such as this, manage to understand it more readily" (ix). How well it succeeds on its own terms is difficult to judge. Shklar provides a running commentary on Hegel's discussions of "Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself" (V.C.), "Self-Alienated Spirit: Culture" (VI. B) and "Spirit which is certain of itself. Morality" (VI.C). These discussions are preceded by an analysis of the comments Hegel makes about the classical *polis*, which Shklar brings together from a number of sections of the work. An introductory chapter sketches the general topography of the book. Evaluating the success of the book as a commentary would require an extended discussion of what one needs to know about the *Phenomenology* to make sense out of it. Such a discussion will not be undertaken here, although it is worth raising the question of whether the notorious difficulties of the *Phenomenology* are alleviated by simply *recounting* what Hegel has said in a different way. Are not the more serious problems the reader encounters not simply with *what* Hegel is saying — which, while occasionally opaque, is hardly as bad as is often claimed — as *why* he happens to be saying *this* precisely at *this point*? If the latter is the case, then we need something more than just a retelling of the story. We need a commentary that makes some rather general systematic claims about the structure of Hegel's argument. 37

Other questions about Shklar's commentary will be pursued here. The book is a discussion of those chapters of the *Phenomenology* that deal "with moral and political ideas" (ix). But, if there are political and moral ideas in the *Phenomenology*, what are they doing there? Given what we know from Fulda and Heinrichs, how can a discussion of politics and morality advance Hegel's systematic argument? Given what we know about Hegel's political writings from roughly the same period, what can be said about their relation to the rather strange discussion of political themes that takes place within the *Phenomenology*? In short, what is the relation of the discussion of these political and moral themes in Hegel's *Phenomenology* to the practical and theoretical philosophy of Hegel's Jena period?

These are not questions that Shklar poses. Indeed, her book seems to foreclose such questions through a number of less than helpful moves. The reader is sent to Stanley Rosen's book for "logical bearings" (xi), an unlikely division of labor in light of some easily apparent discrepancies between what one is told in the two books. 36 There is little attempt to relate the discussion of the *Phenomenology* to others of the Jena writings on politics and morality. Indeed, some of the closing comments on the difference between the *Phenomenology* and the *Philosophy of Right* present as

37. These comments are, of course, also applicable to the paragraph by paragraph commentary provided by Findlay in the new translation of the *Phenomenology*.

38. Shklar, for example, find in the *Phenomenology* a challenging of "one of the most fundamental assumptions of classical thought: the superiority of theoretical over practical reason" (200) while Rosen in contrast argues in his book that Hegel gives primacy to the theoretical accomplishments of the *Logic* (33, 185, 280-283). Likewise, Rosen's insistence on the apoliticality of the *Phenomenology* (for instance pp. 183-184) points in a rather different direction than Shklar's reading.
transformations in Hegel's thinking positions that were already elaborated in the Jena *Entwürfe* but not taken up in the *Phenomenology*. And there is no attempt to address the reader who is familiar with other versions of what the *Phenomenology* might be about. Shklar avoids discussing how her argument differs from others in hope that "the readers of this commentary will immediately turn to the *Phenomenology* itself and then be in a position to cope with the outstanding disputes and various readings directly" (xi).

It is probably only a reader unfamiliar with the present squabbles over what Hegel was up to in the *Phenomenology* who can be very sanguine about some of Shklar's characterizations of the book. She tends to refer to the method of the book as a sort of "historical psychology" (8, 9, 43) without suggesting how this psychology is to be differentiated from the psychology which stands juxtaposed to phenomenology in the later systems. At one point she goes so far as to identify Hegel's discussions of "cycles of self-consciousness" with his discussion of *Geist* (73), thus reconciling the tension between the *Phenomenology* as a "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" with the *Phenomenology* of Spirit" with a stroke of the pen. If this sliding between consciousness and *Geist* and between psychology and phenomenology were not troubling enough, other passages leave one bewildered as to what Shklar expects us to find in Hegel's text. For instance, we are told at one point that "Proust's remembering was...very much like Hegel's in design, a going inward to create a new image out of the past. Proust's range was far greater. For though Hegel roamed over all ages and Proust over just his own time, Hegel described the adventures of the intellect, while Proust omitted nothing that men and women can experience. His was the more universal phenomenology of the soul" (55). What this has to do with Hegel's project of a phenomenology of *spirit* is anyone's guess.

In short, it is not clear that Shklar takes the systematic claims of the *Phenomenology* very seriously and thus, from the start, any confrontation between the structure and the content of the *Phenomenology* is ruled out. She cites with sympathy Josiah Royce's dictum "In the presence of the wayward, I too may be free to judge in my own individual way" (5). It is hardly good advice, and fortunately Shklar does not always follow it. But we are told that "Hegel's work is an incomplete map which we are free to fill out and redraw in our own time and place" (56). It is suggested that the book "might well have ended" with the close of Chapter VI (203) — apparently sparing the reader the chapters on Religion and Absolute Knowing, where the level of reflective thought (Vorstellung), the animus of the Preface, is finally overcome. In short, the attitude toward those aspects of the *Phenomenology* that touch on issues other than politics is casual at best.

This casualness is unfortunate, since Shklar's discussions of the political content of the *Phenomenology* are by far the most extensive and quite often the most sensitive explorations of those concerns now available. For that reason it is worth seeing how far we can go in forcing some of the issues she has sidestepped. A point of departure can be taken from Jean Hyppolite's *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* — a book which, strangely, is not even mentioned in Shklar's account. In the introduction to his discussion of Hegel's chapter on *Geist*, Hyppolite poses the issue of

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39. For example, the discussion of legal personhood in the *Philosophy of Right* is contrasted with that in the *Phenomenology* (Shklar, 205-206) without noting that parallel discussions of personhood, without the pejorative associations which accompany the term in the *Phenomenology* were present as early as the first Jena system (G.S., vol. 6, p. 526; the point is considerably developed in subsequent drafts, see G.S., vol. 8, p. 231ff.)
the status of political analyses in Hegel's *Phenomenology* rather concisely with a contrast of positions advanced by Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Busse in the 1920s and 1930s. 40

Rosenzweig 41 sees the *Phenomenology* as somewhat anomalous in the development of Hegel's writings on politics. In it Hegel abandons the conception of the state as the most exalted form of human community that had been elaborated in the *System der Sittlichkeit* and the natural law essay. According to Rosenzweig, pride of place now goes to morality and religion, which would appear, on the basis of the *Phenomenology*, to represent higher forms of community (326-328). Hyppolite rejects this rather suspect reading, which in effect posits not one but two rather dramatic ruptures in Hegel's thinking about the role of the state. "We would have to agree that there was a break between Hegel's earlier work and the *Phenomenology* and the later work. According to this view, the idea of the human city... is abandoned in favor of a City of God. Later, the argument continues, Hegel returned to his divinization of the state" (327). Clearly, this cumbersome an argument has little to recommend it. In response, Hyppolite advances Busse's case: The *Phenomenology* is viewed as having a position that is fundamentally identical to that of his later *Philosophy of Right*. 42 Apparent differences in the two works are accounted for by noting their rather different concerns. *The Philosophy of Right*, as a part of the *Encyclopedia*, is concerned with the articulations of the moments of the system without attention to the prise de conscience that lies at the heart of the account of the *Phenomenology* (329-331). Hence though the *Phenomenology* may cover some of the same terrain as the later system, it will do so from a different perspective and (as perhaps Hyppolite does not stress enough) with a different intent. The *Phenomenology* is concerned with the experience which consciousness undergoes and which Spirit makes, and hence must present its materials in terms of a structure that plays off the perspectives of "for consciousness" and "in itself." It does so with the intent of providing a prolegomena to a system (although assuredly, a system that in all likelihood would have been different from that eventually published in 1817), not an outline of the system itself.

Hyppolite is also keenly aware that there was something fundamentally new at stake in the *Phenomenology*, even if it could not be posed in as simple a fashion as Rosenzweig had suggested. Discussing the *System der Sittlichkeit* and the natural right essay, Hyppolite notes, "Despite the beauty and validity of certain passages, these works of Hegel's seem oddly archaic. The polis and the Platonic ideal mingle with 18th-century states in a completely unhistorical exposition" (331). Certainly, in these writings new wine is literally being poured into old bottles. Both works are dominated by the dichotomous opposition of household and polity which Hegel seems to have taken over from Aristotle's *Politics* and sought to restore on the basis of the chiasmus of spirit and nature in identity philosophy. Hence, both works face the problem of fitting into this archaic structure the radically modern domain of economic exchanges that take place outside the confines of the household, yet which represent essentially private activities. Needless to say, the results are not happy ones: modern economy is either conceived rather unconvincingly as analogous to the householding of the ancients (the

40. Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. S. Cherniak and J. Heckman (Evanston, 1974), further citations will be made in the text.


42. Martin Busse, *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes und der Staat* (Berlin, 1931). Busse (the name is spelled incorrectly in the translation of Hyppolite; there is no umlaut) was one of the leading Fascist interpreters of Hegel's political thought. See also the companion volume by Julius Binder, Martin Busse and Karl Larenz, *Einführung in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Berlin, 1931).
argument of the natural law essay) or its components are broken up and assigned to both the public and private sides of the opposition (as appears to be the case in the System der Sittlichkeit). Matters are not helped by the persistence in these essays of invocations of long-vanished classes: the Aristotelian politeuteian in the natural law essay, and the class of priests and elders in the System der Sittlichkeit.

Hence the Phenomenology would seem to represent for Hyppolite not so much an explicit rejection of certain earlier political claims as a fundamental rupture in the metatheory in whose terms Hegel frames arguments about politics. "As he discovered his originality with respect to Schelling, he became aware of the necessity of the prise de conscience, and he contraposed the concept to intuition. From that moment on, the ideal of the ancient city was relegated to the past. The substantive spirit of antiquity became the modern spirit, and history no longer appeared alien to the absolute idea" (331-332). With this recognition, the demise of the ancient polis became the irrevocable price of the emergence of self-conscious forms of political community.

Shklar's account does not fall into the same obvious errors as Rosenzweig's. While she does not develop his real insight and note the apparent peculiarity of this discussion of politics in which all of the typical themes of Hegel's earlier political writings (especially the concept of representation by estates) are absent, she does not share his error and take the Phenomenology to be elaborating a positive doctrine of politics on its own. Rather than outlining the rational structure of the modern state, the task of the Phenomenology is, in Shklar's view, fundamentally negative. "It shows with utmost clarity what the modern state is not like and what degree of civic integrity had once been possible" (76). In place of a discussion of the present political order, we have a meditation on a departed one, the classical polis. "If much of the Phenomenology is a lament for Hellas, that is not due to pure nostalgia, but mainly to Hegel's polemic against the false consciousness of subjectivity and isolation" (85). The polis is a counter image against which to measure modern society. It is not capable of being revived (73, 12, 39-41).

The center of gravity of Shklar's account is the exploration of the way in which this vision of the ancient polis is marshalled against the disintegration of the modern public realm. She is keenly alert to the peculiar character of Hegel's neo-classicism. Unlike the majority of his German contemporaries, his vision of Greece was more political than aesthetic, while unlike the more political visions of antiquity that could be found within the non-German republican tradition, his preferred political order was Athenian rather than Spartan or Roman (13, 74, 88, 90, 142). While these comments may underestimate the extent to which other German Grecophiles were conscious of the political dimensions of the polis and while Shklar may have underestimated the extent to which Hegel could at times manifest simultaneous loyalties to both the polis and a Machiavelli-inspired vision of the republican state,

44. Werke..., op.cit., vol. 2, p. 489 (Natural Law, 100); System of Ethical Life, op.cit., p. 158.
45. The point is discussed in Pöggeler, "Die Komposition...." op.cit., p. 332. See also the comprehensive study by Rolf K. Hocever, Stände und Repräsentation beim jungen Hegel (Munich, 1968).
these comments are for the most part very much to the mark. By spelling out the specific character of Hegel’s attachment to the polis, she avoids dissolving his Hellenic vision into that of his contemporaries.

But, when all this is said, it still seems that Shklar’s claim that Athens represented to Hegel the sole image of what a free life (38-41) — as opposed to the independent life of modern man — could have been like seems to overstate the case, just as her characterization of the Phenomenology as “his elegy to that world of freedom” (208) seems to misread the thrust of the work. However caustic Hegel’s views might be on the pretensions of autonomous subjectivity, he never views it simply as an irrevocable curse that forever separates us from the polis. It is the fate of modern times, and as Hegel argued in his inaugural thesis at Jena: “Principium scientiae moralis est reverentia fato habenda” (Werke II, 533). His reverence for the fate is expressed in one of the more beautiful passages of the Phenomenology. Reflecting on how, with the collapse of the religions of the polis, we are left with statues which “are now only stones from which the living soul has flown” and how hymns “are words from which belief has gone,” his elegy for Athens turns into a striking affirmation of modernity: “But, just as the girl who offers us the plucked fruits is more than the Nature which directly provides them... because she sums all this up in a higher mode, in the gleam of the self-conscious eye and in the gesture with which she offers them, so too the spirit of fate that presents us with those works of art is more than the ethical life and the actual world of that nation, for it is the inwardizing in us [Erinnerung, recollection] of the spirit which in them was still outwardly manifested; it is the spirit of the tragic fate which gathers all those individual gods and attributes of the (divine) substance into one pantheon, into the Spirit that is conscious of itself as Spirit” (Phenomenology 456).

The construction of a pantheon — the task assigned to the mythical Theseus of Hegel’s theologico-politico treatise — is now the work of history, a work that has been accomplished and which leaves us, by the very act which separates us from the Hellenic world, with that capacity for self-reflection that places us above it and allows us to internalize it.

The Phenomenology is not so much an elegy for Hellas as an exorcism of Hegel’s own obsession with Athens. It is an apolitical work which, as Shklar notes, “ends when philosophy reaches its goal which lies beyond law, morality and religion” (208). But the later works Hegel writes about politics must be seen as the sequel to this journey. Hegel does not, as Shklar claims, “ask us simply to forget the lost world and to accept the rules such as they are” (208). He has rather come to the point where he can see the way forward for an elaboration of a systematic political theory which rests no longer on an attempt to imitate the grounding of the polis on “natural Sittlichkeit” but rather builds the modern state within the “world of Geist,” whose boundaries are first sketched within the Phenomenology. As George Armstrong Kelly has argued in a paper on Hegel’s debt to Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters now reprinted in his Hegel’s Retreat from Eleusis, 47 “in post-classical society, politics will have to emerge in a new way. The state will have to mediate what was once ‘immediate,’ much in the same way that speculative thought will have to reorder, recover, and remember those harmonies that were once direct and felt. . . . The turn toward politics is correlative to the turn toward philosophy... the aesthetic state of absolute Sittlichkeit is impossible. That impossibility makes necessary a politics and a state mediated by thought” (82, 86). This then is the task which is set for the Philosophy of Right: a state which runs on Geist, on natural ethical life, a state which is consciously mediated by thought.