I. After the End of the Enlightenment

Near the beginning of his *History of Frederick the Great*, Thomas Carlyle shifts his focus from the infant Frederick – who “lies in his cradle back in Berlin, sleeping most of the time” and is thus an unrewarding object for the narrator’s gaze – and turns to Hanover where a “rather disappointing” avenue stretches from the “Town Palace to the country one.” Looking down it we catch a glimpse of “a rather weak but hugely ingenious old gentleman, with bright eyes and long nose, with vast black peruke and bandy legs,” who happens to be making his way down the road. The man is Leibniz and he is on his way to provide a diversion for the Electress Sophie by discussing philosophical matters with her. Carlyle admits that theirs will not be a “very edifying dialogue,” yet it is “the best that can be had in present circumstances.” For Hanover is but the “lunar reflex of Versailles,” and whatever light falls on this court is of French origin. Carlyle urges his reader not to think ill of the mix of “Eclecticism, Scepticism, Tolerance, Theodicea, and Bayle” that Hanover imported from Versailles: “Let us admit that it was profitable, at least that it was inevitable; let us pity it, and be thankful for it, and rejoice that we are well out of it” (Carlyle, 1858, I:34-35)

Carlyle’s account of Frederick’s life offers admirers of the Enlightenment the opportunity to spend some time with a man who loathed the eighteenth century. There is
a guilty pleasure to be found savoring those passages when Carlyle lays his cards on the table:

To me the Eighteenth Century has nothing grand in it, except that grand universal Suicide, named French Revolution, by which it terminated its otherwise most worthless existence with at least one worthy act; — setting fire to its old home and self; and going up in flames and volcanic explosions, in a truly memorable and important manner. A very fit termination, as I thankfully feel, for such a Century. Century spendthrift, fraudulent-bankrupt; gone at length utterly insolvent, without real money of performance in its pocket, and the shops declining to take hypocrisies and speciosities any farther: — what could the poor Century do, but at length admit, "Well, it is so. I am a swindler-century, and have long been, — having learned the trick of it from my father and grandfather; knowing hardly any trade but that in false bills, which I thought foolishly might last forever, and still bring at least beef and pudding to the favored of mankind. And behold it ends; and I am a detected swindler, and have nothing even to eat. What remains but that I blow my brains out, and do at length one true action?" Which the poor Century did; many thanks to it … (Carlyle, 1858, I:7-8).

Faced with a rant like this, admirers of the eighteenth century can take a perverse pleasure in reflecting on the terrible burden that has been placed on later critics of the
Enlightenment: nothing that they will ever write or could ever hope to write will be the equal to Carlyle in its inventiveness, its wit, or its brutality.

The detachment that permeates the best of Carlyle’s attacks flowed from an unshakeable conviction that he was dealing with something that was over and finished. The “swindler-century” had taken gun in hand and blown its brains out: end of story – and the dawning of an age in which stories about that story could be told. We need only contrast Carlyle’s view of the French Revolution with Burke’s to appreciate the rhetorical advantages that this conviction conveyed. At his best Burke can approach Carlyle in the force of his invective, but Carlyle’s History is permeated by a sardonic wit that is lacking in the Reflections. For Carlyle, the passions that drove the Revolution were a thing of the past: they could be loathed, lamented, and ridiculed, they no longer needed to be feared. For Burke, writing in 1791, the end of the Revolution was not yet in sight. The same was true for the mischief wrought by those sinister forces that, at least in Burke’s overheated imagination, lay behind the revolution. Towards the end of his life, Burke offered some words of support to the Abbe Barruel’s campaign to warn the world about the conspiracy of philosophes, freemasons, and Illuminati who he held responsible for hatching the plot that had touched off the Revolution. For Barruel, for Burke, and for the various polemicists who wrote for British anti-Jacobin newspapers, the conspiracy that had been mounted (to borrow some words from John Robison’s version of the story) against “all the religions and governments of Europe” was still active (Schmidt, 2003). Carlyle was free from such phantoms: dreadful though the eighteenth century might have been, we are now well free of its grip.
There is, however, one thing absent in Carlyle’s polemic against the Enlightenment: the term *the Enlightenment*. He was endlessly inventive in the terms of abuse he hurled at the period we call “the Enlightenment.” But the word itself isn’t there. In view of the brilliance of so much of his writing, the absence is scarcely notable. Yet, it may offer us a starting point for thinking about what is involved in talking about the end – and the ends – of enlightenment. Not having a word for something doesn’t, of course, mean that the thing that will eventually be designated by the term wasn’t there. When we look at Carlyle and others, it is easy enough to see that what they were criticizing is something we would call “the Enlightenment.” And since Carlyle and others were critics of “the Enlightenment” it may be tempting to follow the practice initiated by Isaiah Berlin and see these figures as participating in a movement called “the Counter-Enlightenment” (Mail and Wokler, 2003). But, while such a division might be useful for some purposes, it is less than helpful for any number of others.

It can, first of all, promote a specious sense of common purpose to a group of thinkers who share rather little beyond the honor of having been selected, either by Berlin or by subsequent commentators, as part of “the Counter-Enlightenment.” Historians of “the Enlightenment” have begun to doubt whether it is possible to speak of a single Enlightenment, unified around a single set of doctrines. Those who invoke “the Counter-Enlightenment” will likely find themselves forced down the same road, at which point they may find themselves wondering what, if anything, ties together a group of thinkers as diverse in their orientations and interests as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Gottfried Herder, Justus Möser, Joseph de Maistre, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Max Horkheimer & Theodor Adorno. It can also lead, as J. G. A. Pocock (1999) has argued, to an overly restricted view as to what sort of “enlightenment” was being
countered, with the category “Counter-Enlightenment” serving as an all-too convenient resting place for anything that doesn’t fit into the commentator’s sense of what “the Enlightenment” involved: consider how recent literature has questioned whether Johann Gottfried Herder (Norton, 1991) and Justus Möser (Knudsen, 1986) – both classified by Berlin as part of the “Counter-Enlightenment” – might, in fact, have a great deal more in common with certain tendencies in Enlightenment thought than Berlin assumed. Finally, such a neat compartmentalization will make it difficult to see how the notion that there was such a thing as “the Enlightenment” arose in the first place: when tracing the history of concepts, even though the absence of a word for something may not be evidence that the thing wasn’t there, it is an invitation to look more carefully at the way in which past thinkers grappled for concepts whose existence we now take for granted. This last task will occupy me here. In trying to understand what the Enlightenment was and what it still might be, it may help to look at some of the ways in which it was talked about during an age that was not entirely sure what it was all about.

II. Questioning the Ends of Enlightenment

Thanks to the efforts of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thomas Carlyle’s library wound up at Harvard, allowing those who are so inclined to paw through the books he used when writing the *History of Frederick the Great*. One of the more peculiar items in the collection is Johann Georg von Zimmermann, *Fragmente über Friedrich den Grossen zur Geschichte seines Lebens, seiner Regierung, und seines Charakters*. Dating from 1790, the book is (as advertised) a collection of anecdotes about Frederick, with little tying them together beyond their interest in illuminating various aspects of the monarch’s life
and reign as seen from the perspective of his physician. Late in the book, Zimmermann considers the political consequences of Frederick’s death, with special attention to the reactions of the “Berlin Aufklärungssynagoge.” Synagoge is employed here as a synonym for the French clique, which Zimmerman defined, in turn, through a reference to the Schattenriss von Berlin (a motley collection of sketches of Berlin life – some fairly risqué – dating from 1788), as designating “the union of various persons towards the advancement of their needs” (259-60). The Berlin that emerges from the Schattenriss is a city populated by Litterarcliquen that “take pride in working toward the enlightenment of the people.” In the wake of Frederick’s death, these groups sought “to enlighten” Friedrich Wilhelm II, the new monarch. Yet, Zimmerman warns, the prejudices that these groups harbor “are entirely contrary to enlightenment” (252-3).

It is difficult to be entirely sure what Zimmermann is driving at and much of this difficulty stems from his failure to give us what we have come to expect. We know that Friedrich Wilhelm II responded to what we have come to call “the Berlin Enlightenment” with edicts on religion and on censorship, edicts which in turn touched off a vigorous pamphlet war in which champions of Aufklärung gathered under the banner of freedom

1 This construction parallels English usage from the same period where “synagogue” was employed, in controversial literature, as a term of abuse from gatherings devoted to the pursuit of ends which stand in opposition to those of the pious. To cite a few examples from the Oxford English Dictionary: Milton referred to the Scots Presbytery in Belfast as an “unchristian Synagoge” while, in 1674, Hickman expressed the wish that “no Arminians had … forsaken the Church of England, and took sanctuary in the Synagogue of Rome.”
of the press and championed a decidedly unorthodox interpretation of Christian beliefs that has come to be called “neology.”² In this view of things, the ascent of Friedrich Wilhelm II to the throne signifies the beginning of a series of events that would mark “the end of the Enlightenment in Prussia” (Lestition 1993). Zimmermann, however, doesn’t see things this way. While he is quite well-disposed towards Friedrich Wilhelm II, he also – like the author of the *Schattenriss*—presents himself as an advocate of “enlightenment,” though his enlightenment is not the same sort of enlightenment that is advocated by the members of the Berlin Aufklärungsynagoge. “Germany’s true enlightenment,” he insists, “hangs on countless threads, it is the consequence of a multitude of causes, it does not have an exclusively Berlin origin, it is not at all a Berlin monopoly” (288). Where, he asks, is there a more enlightened land than England, and what do the members of the Berlin enlightenment clique really know about conditions in England? Only in a madhouse, he continues, could it be argued that the fall of the Bastille (which he seems to applaud) was “the fruit of the Berlin Enlightenment” (289). He concludes that while there may be widespread affection for the word Aufklärung in Germany, the respect for the word is rarely accompanied by much attention to the actual thing (295).

There is, Zimmermann suggests, much confusion about what may properly be
called “enlightenment.” The members of the Berlin Aufklärungssynagoge are speaking a
different language than he – and, one would assume, his implied audience – speaks. So
he attempts to explain what they are saying by translating their terms back to the tongue
from which they have been pilfered – which, he argues, is French. The scheme that was
hatched in the literary cliques

is now called in Berlin Aufklärung (Illuminatisme); the members
of the synagogue are called Aufklärer (Illuminants); and
Aufgeklärte (Illuminés) are the blind slaves of this sect. Of the
true enlightenment (progrès des lumières) nothing is spoken in the
Berlin Aufklärungssynagogue (282).

Zimmermann was not alone in his confusion as to what was meant when the ideal of
Aufklärung was invoked. Since 1784, when Johann Friedrich Zöllner – a clergyman,
educator, freemason, and member of an exclusive secret society in Berlin called by its
members the “Friends of Enlightenment” and known to the rest of the world (to the
extent that it was known at all) as the “Wednesday Society” – inserted a footnote in an
article of his in the Berlinische Monatsschrift asking for someone to answer the question
“What is enlightenment?,” the question of what enlightenment involved had been hotly
debated (Schmidt 1996). The discussion began with a complaint: Zöllner couldn’t (or at
least feigned that he couldn’t) understand what those who contributed articles to the
Berlinische Monatsschrift (contributors who, it should be noted, were members of the
same secret society to which he belonged) meant when they spoke of Aufklärung. It
ended in utter confusion, with one journal publishing a review of the debate which
concluded that the word had been so divorced from any clear conventions of usage that it was unclear what exactly it might mean (Anonymous, 1790).

Yet this much about the meaning of the word was clear: to pose the question “What is enlightenment?” at the end of the eighteenth century was to request clarification regarding a process or an activity, rather than to ask for a definition of an historical period or an intellectual movement. If this nuance is frequently overlooked today – where studies of what we call “the Enlightenment” routinely begin with an appeal to Kant’s 1784 response to Zöllner’s question – it was not lost on the man who first translated Kant’s response into English. In his 1798 translation, John Richardson rendered the title of Kant’s “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” as “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightening?” thus capturing, better than any modern translator (including the author of this paper) that Kant took Aufklärung to designate something that one did, rather than an age in which one was living (Kant, 1798, 3). What exactly this process might involve and what its proper ends might be was something that was open for dispute, hence the massive outpouring of essays which attempted to distinguish “true enlightenment” from “false enlightenment” (Schneiders, 1974). But while the proper ends of this process might be in dispute, there was no suggestion in these essays that any of their authors thought they were attempting to characterize a particular historical period – a period with more or less clear temporal boundaries – known as “the Enlightenment.” The “enlightenment” with which eighteenth-century commentaries wrestled was an activity that was oriented towards a diverse set of ends, rather than a period that could be defined by a beginning and an end. Setting up those temporal boundaries would be the task of the nineteenth century.
III. Ending the Enlightenment

Paul Leopold Haffner came to Mainz in 1864 as a thirty-five year old Catholic priest, having studied at Tübingen and having briefly taught philosophy. He became bishop of the city in 1886 and held the post until his death in 1899. His importance for our discussion resides in a small book that he published in same year that he took up his post in Mainz: *Die deutsche Aufklärung. Eine historische Skizze*. Haffner found little to like about the Enlightenment and – like his other major publication, a history of materialism – the purpose of the book was to recount the history of a movement that good Catholics should find appalling. There is little in Haffner’s study that cannot be found in later accounts, but that is what makes it significant. Here, in the middle of the nineteenth century, we have a book that lays out a history of the Enlightenment that is not all that different in its contents from some of the sketches that we can find in present-day textbooks. Where eighty years earlier Germans were confused as to what *Aufklärung* designated, Haffner so confident that he understands what the Enlightenment was all about that he attempts an historical sketch of its German wing.

He treats his readers, however, to a moment of hesitation at the very start of the book, professing confusion as to his topic: will he be recounting a history of “German enlightenment” or of “German endarkenment [Verfinsternung]”? Faced with such a quandary he suggests that it might be advisable to follow the advice of Pius IX, who argued that when attempting to understand the meaning of a word, one should go back to its origin. And following the advice of the Holy Father, Haffner discovers that
Enlightenment is a sublime word, if one goes back to its meaning; it means illumination of the spirit through truth, liberation from the shadows of error, or uncertainty, of doubt. Enlightenment is, in its deepest meaning, the transfiguration (Verklärung) of reason (Haffner, 1864,1).

To write a history of this enlightenment, one would have to “begin with God and end with God.”

This, however, is not the history that Haffner will offer. He is, he confesses, “too much a child of the nineteenth century” to depart so violently from its conventions of speech. Instead, he proposes to speak the language of his own day, “which exchanges the meaning of light and darkness” and produces a literature which regards “the light of Christian centuries as dark gloom” and which “greets the shadows of doubt and the progress of religious barbarity as light” (Haffner, 1864, 4). The enlightenment whose history he will recount rests on a rejection of

1) all truths, which have their origin in divine supernatural revelation; … 2) authority and belief in authority as a principle of knowledge; and … 3) all sources of knowledge that lie above the level of the human mind (Haffner, 1864, 4).

This enlightenment, then, is “purely negative, destructive, empty; it has no positive content and no productive principle.” In order to be counted among the truly enlightened, one must “know nothing” (Haffner, 1864, 4).
While Haffner cannot match Carlyle in the inventiveness of the language in which he frames his indictment, the two share the conviction that whatever it was that so unsettled the eighteenth century has now run its course. Haffner argues that the Enlightenment was laid to rest by “Schiller and Goethe, Schelling and Hegel” and by the arrival of the romantic school, in whose work he sensed a foreshadowing of a rising “Catholic consciousness” which promises to replace the “cold light” of the enlightenment with the “warm” light of life (Haffner, 1864, 9, 141-3). Thus, his initial uncertainty as to whether he is narrating a tale of enlightenment or endarkenment is little more than a rhetorical ploy. He lives in an age which has learned to use die Aufklärung as a way of designating a particular historical period, a period populated by a particular cast of characters, most of whom will be mentioned in the course of his survey. He also lives in an age that has settled on a group of adjectives that can be attached to this noun: for instance, “cold,” “narrow,” “empty.” In knowing which adjectives to choose when talking about the Enlightenment he was also a child of his age.

How did his age get to be the way it was and to talk the way it did? The decisive influence seems to be G. W. F. Hegel, who was one of the first, if not the first, to employ the term Aufklärung as a name for a particular historical period. In the Phenomenology of Spirit (1806) he still used the term as a way of designating a process describes a process — the spread of “pure insight” — rather than a particular historical period (Hegel, 1970, III:400). As Robert Pippin has rightly observed, in the Phenomenology the term refers to “a human activity, not a happening but a doing” (Pippin, 1997, 7). However, in his Berlin lectures from the 1820s, he began to use the word differently. At the close of the lectures on the philosophy of history, he reflected on an event whose impact he himself had experienced: the French Revolution. Explaining to his students what the world was like
when he was their age, he spoke of the enthusiasm that had gripped his contemporaries when they learned that “the old framework of injustice” had toppled overnight, unable to resist the onslaught of a new and triumphant ideal: the notion that constitutions should be established on the basis of reason (Hegel, 1970, XII:529). The celebration, however, proved premature. The Revolution collapsed into the Terror, the Terror gave way to the Directory, the Directory crumbled before Napoleon, war engulfed Europe, and — when the “fifteen years’ farce” was finally played out — the monarchy was restored. There were some, he noted, who charged that “the French Revolution resulted from philosophy.” It was an accusation he was not inclined to dismiss, though he stressed that the philosophy which provided the “first impetus” for the Revolution was not “the concrete comprehension of absolute truth” that, presumably, he was offering his students, but rather that “abstract thought” for which the French had a particular weakness. This superficial approach to philosophy, which summoned all established authorities to the tribunal of reason and attempted to deduce both the laws of nature and “the substance of what is right and good” from individual consciousness, was known by the “infamous name” Aufklärung.3

3 The phrase translated as “infamous name” appears in appears in Friedrich Stieve’s lecture note from the winter semester of 1826-1827 as “verruchten Namen” (Hegel [1968] 915, footnote). Lasson suggests that the term may have been the result of a mishearing and that Hegel presumably had said “verrufenen Namen.” The English word “infamous” encompasses both German terms. The German verrufen refers to the reputation enjoyed by a thing, rather than the thing itself, i.e. infamous in the sense of “held in infamy, while ” the German verrucht — “monstrous” or “abominable” — refers to the thing itself, rather than its reputation, i.e. infamous in
Similar uses of the word can be found in his other lecture cycles from the Berlin period. In his 1825-26 lectures on the history of philosophy he used *Aufklärung* to designate the “German form” of the broad movement in eighteenth-century that sought to turn “natural feelings and sound human understanding” into a principle that could be used to scrutinize religion and ethical life (Hegel, 1990, III:206-7). In other texts from the same period, the word was extended to encompass eighteenth century French and English thought as well (Hegel, 1970, 431). The same pattern can be found in the Berlin lectures on the philosophy of religion, where *Aufklärung* denotes the movement of thought that turned against the doctrinal system of the churches in the name of “rational theology” (Hegel, 1984, 122-125). It rejected the doctrine of the Trinity as incoherent, thus embracing an abstract and shallow approach to religion that, in the end, deprived the notion of God of all content (Hegel, 1985, 244). A mode of thought that “knows only of negation, of limit, of determinacy as such” it “does an absolute injustice to content” and represents “the ultimate pinnacle of the formal culture of our time” (Hegel, 1985, 344-6).

Thus, in his Berlin lectures, Hegel used *Aufklärung* as a way of designating an historical epoch that was now completed. We are separated from it by the French Revolution, which both marks the end of the period and proves to be the end towards which *Aufklärung* had been moving (whether it knew it or not) all along. The same event the sense of “deserving of infamy.” Lasson assumed that Hegel employed the weaker of these two terms, while Stieve thought he was hearing the former. In any case, the use of either phrase is further complicated by its use in conjunction with “name” — i.e., is it the “name” which is infamous or monstrous or the event to which the name refers?
which terminates the *Aufklärung* also, allegedly, reveals its true character: it was abstract, cold, and narrow, it had no respect for faith or tradition, it was French, and when put into practice it was the cause of public mayhem of a sort that was historically unprecedented. Not the least of Hegel’s achievements was to have framed a way of talking about the Enlightenment that would have a career long after his own particular version of the story had been dismissed or forgotten.

**IV. The Enlightenment Becomes History**

To see what historians would subsequently do with Hegel’s account we need only look at the work of one of his former Berlin students, the historian Max Duncker. His 1845 lecture on the “crisis of the Renaissance” opened with a summary of recent German intellectual history that saw it as moving through four periods, the first of which was designated as *die Aufklärung*. Duckner, like Hegel before him, held that the impact of *Aufklärung* was primarily negative. It destroyed, but it could not create: “the enlightened gaze of the understanding … was unable to comprehend and conceptualize the product of drives, of fantasy, of feeling” (Southard, 1994, 72-5). In Duckner’s account, it fell to the Romantic period to find a way to overcome these failings, just as it fell to the period of “philosophical rationalism” (a period that Duckner associated with German idealism in general and Hegel in particular) to remedy the failings of Romanticism. It remained for the present — designated by Duckner as a period of “historical rationalism” — to correct the shortcomings of German idealism.

The temporal boundaries of the historical period that came to be designated as *die Aufklärung* remained somewhat unclear. Historians of philosophy such as Schwegler
tended to follow Hegel’s lead and trace the origins of the Aufklärung to Descartes and to see Kant’s work as signaling its conclusion. Literary historians typically used the term to denote a period that began in the late seventeenth century and ended either with the revolt of the Sturm und Drang shortly after the middle of the eighteenth century or with the rise of the so-called “Classical Period” represented by Goethe and Schiller.4 One consequence of carving up history in this way was that it tended to remove figures such as Kant or Schiller from the ranks of Aufklärer, making it all the easier to present the Aufklärung as an impoverished period, largely derivative of French models, which — at least in Germany — was quickly overcome. This, indeed, was one of Haffner’s chief points: the “German Enlightenment” was not, in fact, German at all — it was a French import (Haffner, 1864, 8).

English usage was largely dependent on this German literature, but tended to lag behind it, as can be seen by the difficulties that English translators of the works of Hegel and of German historians of philosophy had in coming up with an English equivalent for Aufklärung. The convention of translating die Aufklärung as the Enlightenment was not

4 Book Three of Hermann Hettner (1894), which deals with the “Classical Age of German Literature,” begins with an introduction entitled, “The Battle Against the Limits of the Enlightenment” and then goes on to a discussion of the Sturm und Drang. Heinrich Julian Schmidt (1886) has a chapter on “Enlightenment and Pietism 1687-1699” which examines Pufendorf and Thomasius, among others. It is followed by sections devoted to “Die Kopfzeit 1720-1748” and to “The Rise of Idealism 1748-1763.” For a brief discussion of the question of periodization in nineteenth century literary historians, see Batts, 1993, 84-5.
established until close to the end of the century. Until that time, translators experimented with terms like “the Lighting Up” or “the Illumination,” employed the French Éclaircissement, or simply left the German term untranslated (Schmidt, 2003). Even when, early in the next century, the Princeton philosopher John Grier Hibben published The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (1910) – the first book in English to carry the term in its title – he seems to have been unsure whether his readers would be familiar with what it was that his book was discussing. The opening of the book gives the impression of a man attempting to cover all the possible bases: within the space of two pages Hibben refers to the period as “the Enlightenment, or Aufklärung,” as the “philosophical century,” as “the age of illumination, or enlightenment,” and, finally, that old standby: “the age of reason” (3-4).

For Hibben, the Enlightenment was “an age characterized by a restless spirit of inquiry” and animated by a spirit of “searching investigation and criticism” (3). He argued that it was a period of interest to his readers not only because of its own merits but also for its “representative value” but also because it illustrated the path traversed by “great thought movements in general” (7-8). In good Hegelian fashion Hibben argued that movements of thought typically begin with the expression of an idea that is “necessarily partial, one-sided, or extreme” and then move on to a stage where the idea is “subjected to a running fire of criticism,” a stage in which contradictions and inconsistencies are brought to light. When these controversies have run their course, the stage is set for “a period of reconstruction” in which “contradictions are resolved, limitations are removed, whatever may have been inadequate is completed” by supplying insights that were lacking in the original statement of the idea (8). Thus, in Hibben’s presentation, the Enlightenment begins with Locke’s Essay Concerning Understanding, a
work that inspired such divergent philosophies as Berkeley’s idealism, the rationalism of Wolff and Leibniz, and the materialism of Priestley, Diderot, Helvetius, and Holbach. Its shortcomings were subsequently elaborated by Hume, and Hume’s criticism prepared the way for Kant’s efforts at reconstruction. While the overarching Hegelian structure of his account sometimes seems forced, Hibben’s scholarship demonstrates a wide reading in the area of eighteenth-century philosophy: a year of study in Berlin acquainted him with the work of Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Herder and he had an appreciation for the arguments of Diderot and Rousseau. His discussions are well-informed and devoid of the animosity that had marked so many nineteenth-century accounts of eighteenth-century philosophy. Indeed, to read Hibben is to be reminded of a much more famous work, a work that would eventually be translated into English with the same title as Hibben’s then-forgotten book: Ernst Cassirer’s *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*.5

Like Hibben, Cassirer saw individual thinkers as part of a larger story involving the development of Western thought. In an oft-quoted passage he described the aims of the book as an attempt to present the Enlightenment in its “characteristic depth” rather than “breadth,” to elucidate its “conceptual origin” and its “underlying principles” rather than to record “the totality of its historical manifestations and results” (v). Cassirer’s concern with seeing the work of individual thinkers the context of the broader development of modern philosophy would draw a sharp critique from Peter Gay in his well-known critique of his teacher’s work (Gay, 1967). Gay’s attempt to write a “social

5 Hibben’s study was listed in the bibliography of Cassirer’s 1931 article on “Enlightenment” in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, but Cassirer makes no reference to Hibben’s work in his own book, which did not contain a bibliography.
history of ideas” would, in turn, be criticized by Robert Darnton, who suggested that Gay had not been entirely successful in breaking free from the sort of history of ideas that Cassirer had been writing (Darnton, 1971). But even earlier, doubts about the coherence of Cassirer’s account of the Enlightenment were being raised by scholars who found it difficult to see how the particular aspects of the Enlightenment they had been exploring were supposed to fit into the narrative that Cassirer had constructed (Dieckmann, 1961; Niklaus, 1967; Crocker, 1987).

In retrospect, it is not difficult to see why such doubts were bound to surface. In Hegel’s Berlin lectures, Aufklärung designated an historical period – embodied by a particular set of philosophers – that played a specific role in the overall architectonic of his philosophical system. In the decades after Hegel’s death, confidence in the coherence or the utility of his system faded, but the rough outlines he had set for the Enlightenment continued to serve as a way of structuring historical narratives. The particular thinkers who made up his Enlightenment continued to figure in these accounts, but over time were joined by other figures. For a while it was possible – witness the work of Hibben and Cassirer – to provide some sort of philosophical coherence to accounts of this sort, even without the resources of the Hegelian system, and, over time, other ways of patching together a story about the Enlightenment would be attempted (e.g., Paul Hazard’s attempt to see the Enlightenment as the crucial moment in a “crisis of European consciousness”). But as a focus on the social history of ideas came to replace the grand, overarching narrative that had been the stock in trade of Hegelian accounts, the alleged unity of the Enlightenment tended to look more and more doubtful. By the last decades of the twentieth century what might be described a “pluralization of the Enlightenment” was well underway. Scholars had gotten used to speaking of various national enlightenments
– Scottish, German, Italian, and, eventually, English (Porter & Teich, 1981) – and then, within some of these national enlightenments, they began to discover “rival enlightenments” struggling with one another (Hunter, 2001). Even those who criticized this tendency and sought to describe an enlightenment that transcended national borders only wound up introducing another division into the already fractured landscape: the distinction between a cosmopolitan “radical” enlightenment and the various, more conservative, national enlightenments (Israel, 2001). Social historians were accustomed to looking beneath the “high” enlightenment of famous thinkers and their texts in order to map the “low enlightenment” of the clandestine book market. Still others focused on the network of institutions – scientific academies, secret societies, coffee-houses, and salons – that served as the arena in which the various ideas and projects associated with the Enlightenment (as well as a variety of ideas and projects that only now came to be associated with the Enlightenment) circulated. It is, then, hardly surprising that in the face of this pluralization of enlightenments, some have suggested – perhaps none more insistently than J. G. A. Pocock – that it might be better to dispense with the definite article and eschew claims about “the Enlightenment” in favor of a more careful account of the languages spoken by the various enlightenments that inhabited eighteenth-century Europe (Pocock, 1998, 7).

V. Enlightenment After “the Enlightenment”

This proliferation of enlightenments is not an entirely unfortunate development. Indeed, with apologies to Carlyle, we might regard it as profitable, probably inevitable, and less an occasion for pity than for gratitude. That it was probably inevitable should be
clear from the arguments of the preceding section: absent an overarching philosophical structure of the sort Hegel had once provided, it is difficult to see how the various individuals, institutions, and project which we have come to associate with the Enlightenment can be seen as part of a single story. The demise of such accounts has been profitable in at least two ways. First, it has allowed scholars working in the area of eighteenth-century studies to pursue research into thinkers, institutions, and projects that did not figure prominently in the sorts of overarching accounts of “the Enlightenment” that one finds in Hibben, Cassirer, and even in Gay. Second, it has also provided a way of responding to those critics of “the Enlightenment Project” whose recycle a series of rhetorical tropes that can be traced back to the nineteenth century: “the Enlightenment” these critics attack is largely a creature of their own (or, more likely, Hegel’s) making and might best be regarded as the latest form taken by a literature whose scholarly credentials have long passed their expiration date.6

Some scholars, however, have questioned whether its pluralization entails too great a cost. John Robertson has recently sought to “make a case for the Enlightenment in the singular” by restoring “a definite intellectual content” to the Enlightenment and then examining the ways in which this content was articulated in differing social contexts (Robertson, 2003). He argues that this “intellectual content” must be more sensitive to the actual concerns of the historical Enlightenment than either the somewhat simplified version of the Enlightenment that Isaiah Berlin used as the foil for his Counter-

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Enlightenment or the overly philosophical conception employed by Ernst Cassirer (73-5). On the other hand, against those who would reduce the Enlightenment to its social or institutional settings, Robertson insists,

If ideas are no longer the focus of attention, it is much harder to define and to defend the Enlightenment’s distinctive identity. It was as a movement of ideas that the Enlightenment acquired its historical significance, for good and ill; to marginalize its intellectual content, as social and cultural historians tend to do, is to make “Enlightenment” into a label of convenience, with little or no substantive significance (77-78).

Robertson proposes that the “intellectual content” of the Enlightenment is to be found in its “commitment to understanding, and hence to advancing, the causes and conditions of human betterment in this world.” Emphasizing that the “first part of this formula is as important as the second,” Robertson sees three concerns as central to the Enlightenment’s efforts to understand the causes and conditions of human betterment: 1) the systematic study of human nature, 2) inquiries into the causes of “material betterment, the subject matter of political economy,” and 3) more general investigations, beyond the more specific concerns of political economy, with the historical progress of society “from ‘barbarism’ to ‘refinement’ or ‘civilization’” (78). In demonstrating the ways in which

Robertson’s claim, however, that Cassirer saw Kant’s philosophy as providing “a systematic summation of the intellectual project of the entire Enlightenment” tends to overstate the role of Kant in Cassirer’s account. For a corrective, see Wright (2001, 91-3).
this particular set of ideas was put into practice, Robertson proposes a comparative study of the activity of enlightenment that focuses on “its development in two of its most distant settings: Scotland and Naples.” By focusing on two “national contexts” that differed markedly in geography, history, and intellectual resources, Robertson hopes to show how – in spite of these differences – “a common engagement with the Enlightenment” can be seen (82).

Robertson grants that the Enlightenment he proposes to investigate “does not include everything which many recent scholars have wished to associate with it” and that a focus on the Enlightenment, understood in this way, will make it necessary “to set aside much that recent scholarship has suggested is of great interest” (though he is quick to add that this does not mean that “what is set aside should not be studied in its own right”). This more restricted focus, he argues, yields considerable benefits:

… the unrestricted definition Enlightenment, or its alternative, the admission that there were multiple Enlightenments, has rendered the subject so blurred and indeterminate that it is impossible to reach any assessment of its historical significance. The Enlightenment for which I have made a case here is one, I suggest, which existed as an historical phenomena, rather than an artificial philosophical construct. It is not an Enlightenment which can be held directly responsible for the horrors, any more than for the advances, of the twentieth century; far too much history lies in between. But as a specific intellectual movement of the eighteenth
century, it is an Enlightenment which can be matched against the conditions which faced it in its own time (82).

While there is much in this proposal that is sensible and promising, it may be worth asking whether Robertson’s distinction between the Enlightenment as “historical phenomenon” and as “philosophical construct” holds up.

If the history of attempts to respond to the question “What is enlightenment?” that has been traced in this paper is accurate, it would appear that where Robertson sees “an historical phenomenon,” others might well see an historian’s construct. This construct is, in many respects, preferable to the various philosophical constructs that Robertson (rightly) questions, but it is, for better or worse, a construct – a way of bringing coherence to a decidedly messy historical reality by highlighting certain features of that reality and downplaying others. Robertson’s construct has the advantage of capturing an aspect of efforts at enlightenment that is of central importance: the conviction that enlightenment was a process, an activity, something that one did. He has focused attention on some central components of this activity: the framing of sciences of human nature, political economy, and historical development. But he does this at the cost of neglecting certain other activities that other historians have seen as important parts of the process of enlightenment. For instance, would the concern with the cultivation of a new understanding of what was involved in “civility,” a concern that Daniel Gordon (1994) has explored in his work on the French Enlightenment, be included in those activities which Robertson sees as part of “the Enlightenment” or is Gordon’s work concerned with one of those (otherwise worthy) areas of inquiry that fall outside the conception of Enlightenment that Robertson seeks to articulate? Or what about those Spinozists,
materialists, and pantheists who made up Jonathan Israel’s cosmopolitan “radical enlightenment” (Israel, 2001)? Robertson would seem to want to exclude them from his account of the Enlightenment understood as a “historical phenomenon” because “Spinoza’s materialism did not exhaust the philosophical resources available to Enlightenment thinkers” (79) and because those who focused on the bettering of this world did not, necessarily, have to deny the possibility of future redemption in another world. Yet, Israel has presented us with a group of thinkers who labored under the impression that the improvement of this world involved, in part, efforts at unmasking the ways in which hopes of a better world had been exploited by priests and kings for their own benefit. The fact that Spinozism was not the only resource available to Enlightenment thinkers does nothing to alter the fact that Israel has discovered a group of Spinozists who saw themselves as engaged in what they took to be enlightenment.

If the study of eighteenth century texts teaches us anything it is that the answer to the question of what enlightenment involved was not entirely obvious to those who thought they were doing it—which was, after all, the reason why Pastor Zöllner asked his question in the first place. To be sure, nothing obliges historians to remain as confused about such questions as those who were asking them. But it would seem that at least part of the task of making sense of the Enlightenment “as an historical phenomenon” would be to avoid—in the effort to make things neater—throwing out too many of the conflicting images of enlightenment that populated the eighteenth century. Those conflicting images offer us our best contemporary record of what was involved in the “historical phenomenon” that we call “the Enlightenment.” All the rest is construct and commentary.
Kant was well aware of this. Thirty years ago Franco Venturi (1971, 1-17) suggested that the understanding of the European Enlightenment “from Kant to Cassirer and beyond” had been dominated by a “philosophical interpretation of the German Aufklärung which had led historians to overlook the political dimensions of the Enlightenment. He may have been right about the part of this history that runs from Hegel to Cassirer and beyond, but he was less than fair to Kant. Kant’s account of what enlightenment involved was, after all, rather catholic: he defined it, quite simply, as the free use of public reason. Aside from the requirement of publicity, he had rather little to say about what counted as a contribution to enlightenment. This would, presumably, be something that would also have to be decided in the tribunal of public deliberation. Kant’s response to Zöllner’s question may be too diffuse to serve as a definition of “the Enlightenment” – though the not inconsiderable body of work that has grown out of Jürgen Habermas’ attempt to see what Kant’s understanding of enlightenment might mean in terms of the development of the “bourgeois public sphere” suggests that it has not been without significance (Habermas, 1962). But, as an attempt to capture something of what enlightenment might have meant to those who were engaged in it, it acquits itself rather well.

What, in the end, does it mean to “make a case for the Enlightenment”? As an historical construct, as a way of grouping historical materials into a coherent narrative, “the Enlightenment” will prove its utility by the sort of research it provokes, research which – if the past history of the notion – is any indication, will force us to keep testing our generalizations about the Enlightenment against the staggering variety of evidence that the eighteenth century provides as to what might (or might not) count as part of this Enlightenment. Those who are attempting to “make a case for the Enlightenment” may
have something to gain by trying to deal with the objections of those who, like Pocock, have been filing briefs against “the Enlightenment” and advocating the multiplying of enlightenments. Likewise, those who have found Pocock’s tack promising can be grateful to scholars like Robertson for providing an alternative to the accounts of “the Enlightenment” that populated the earlier literature.

Making the case for enlightenment, however, involves something different from defending “the Enlightenment.” Critics of “the Enlightenment Project” typically ignore this distinction and then proceed to level attacks on something that diverges marked from what historians typically understand as “the Enlightenment.” At their best, these criticisms raised questions about what ought to count as rational, what sorts of activities should be considered reasonable, what sorts of rights (if any) individuals ought to enjoy, what role (if any) religious beliefs should play in civil society, and so on. While the questions that critics of “the Enlightenment” are raising may be worth considering, the historical claims that accompany these questions lag well behind current scholarship on the Enlightenment. It might be worth pointing this out. In clarifying how we think about the issues such critics raise, it might also be helpful to read some works by thinkers who have been the part of one or another of the enlightenments that historians have explored. This is all the more necessary since critics of “the Enlightenment Project” do not always seem to have spent much time with eighteenth-century texts. But, in the end, when we enter into discussions – whether as historians, as political theorists, or as citizens – of the questions that critics of the Enlightenment are trying to raise, it might be helpful to realize that we are neither making a case for nor against the Enlightenment. What we are, instead, engaging in efforts at enlightenment – an activity that, pace Carlyle, is by no means finished.


