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One future or many? November 14, 15, and 16, 2002

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Boston University Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future

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Boston University
ONE FUTURE OR MANY?

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ONE FUTURE OR MANY?

Will each region go its own way?

Which might lead the way?

November 14, 15, and 16, 2002

Organized by

David Fromkin

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SESSION ONE
David Calleo

Europe: What Will It Become? Will It Be a Model?

In the first half of the twentieth century Europe was the world’s greatest problem. Its grand experiment with regional integration has arguably made it the world’s model region. Just as Europe invented the nation-state and exported it to the rest of the world, it developed the regional, confederated model, which retains the many advantages of nation-states—consensus, participation, community—but mitigates traditional dangers. Can this formula be exported to other regions?

The prospects for success elsewhere depend on what the European Union is and what was responsible for its success. It was once widely believed that integration into the EU was a self-propelling functionalist process, where economic integration spilled over into political integration and nation-states gradually lost power to a federal center. A recent counterargument sees the EU as a genuinely new political form that is rejuvenating nation-states without requiring them to abandon sovereignty. Instead they enhance it through perpetual negotiation with neighbors. The resulting hybrid is a confederacy with significant federal elements.

Inherent in this functionalist model is a tendency toward stasis. Integration creates new opponents, which combine to stop further integration. Although some of this happened during the Cold War, the process started up again under such external shocks as the collapse of Bretton Woods, which led to the European monetary union, or the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which led to Maastricht. Looking at the EU in this broader view emphasizes the political will exercised by such member states as France and Germany.

The EU is not mechanical integration spilling over into the political, but a concert of regional powers shaped by their shared, traumatic historical experience. That political will was born in two terrible wars and the resultant determination to avoid repeating them. The Cold War, with an occupied and defeated Germany, provided the idea of European unity time for incubation. Military problems were handled by the American protectorate, leaving European states free to
concentrate on economic development. The US was an incentive to these developments by fostering a relatively open international system. Its success depended on a particular set of geographical, historical, and geopolitical circumstances.

Such an economic and political package is not easily exportable because conditions for its success are not easy to replicate. We may nevertheless try to deconstruct it into its various parts and see if they have relevance for other regions in the world. ASEAN offers one possibility; the other is a sort of East Asian concert, although it may not possess Europe’s potential to become an autarchic block due to its dependence on imported capital and its vulnerability to financial shocks caused by the dollar’s volatility. Its members do not trade with each other, but with the US, and they maintain a global, rather than a regional orientation. A breakdown in the global economy may give rise to a prosperity sphere. Who will dominate it and how it will be organized are still to be determined, as well as the disparity between small and large countries.

The Asian Free Trade Area, to which we can add Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, is trying to intensify core Asian economies, although it is unclear if we are witnessing a coming together or a struggle for regional dominance. Another possibility is a concert of China with its productive capacity, Russia with its raw materials, and Japan with its capital. Could such a concert include India and Pakistan in some kind of Asian Westphalian system? There are serious obstacles. We are not dealing with a unifying regional tradition or with small, compact countries, but with vast empires that have spent most of their history isolated from each other. Another problem is American interests, which prefer bilateral relationships they can dominate and control.

America’s policy of encouraging unipolar models can become unstable. Should Europe consolidate, Russia revive, and China experience rapid growth, the resulting plural world would contest American dominance. The US, interested in prolonging its leadership and managing its own decline, might grow less confrontational and wish to appease rising Eurasians. In any case, the US will play an important role in the future evolution of the Eurasian system, either as a patron or an irritant creating an opposing Eurasian concert.
By 2015 or so, China’s GDP will be equal to America’s. Huge economic problems are developing, even if all the growth is fresh, especially if this growth occurs at the expense of other nations and involves the environment, energy, etc. A concert of nations could anticipate and plan for them before they get out of control. Economic integration may not seem impossible once technology narrows these distances.

Aspects of the European experience may be relevant to Eurasia despite powerful traditional cultures. A sort of consulate will be necessary, as well as permanent representatives and a small technocratic commission, which would answer to everybody. The UN could serve that function, but presently it is too vast and in need of reform. One can imagine a world organized regionally, with the Security Council as a summit.

**SESSION ONE**
Tony Smith
*Response*

By taking a functionalist view of economic spillover, David makes an important contribution to our understanding how the increasingly integrated union is propelled not so much by internal dynamics as by responses to external shocks. Globalization, going back to the ’70s, made Europe realize it needed a tightly integrated market to be economically competitive. The second shock was the collapse of the Soviet Union.

There have been two new shocks. The first is the growing European sense of abandonment by the US, which, by engaging in increasingly unilateral policies, seems to them to be more interested in Russia than in its older European partners. The US once did much to foster European integration, but now seems to be moving away from it. Europe is asking how its security and economic policies should respond to this change. Some predict that a withdrawal of American power will cause the EU to stutter to a stop, but there is also the possibility that the divergence of Europe and the US will lead to a greater consolidation of the EU.
The second new shock is the current attempt to broaden, rather than deepen, the EU. If the EU Constitutional Convention is successfully completed according to German ideas of European integration, broadening may give extra weight to the European experiment. A great deal depends on the Constitutional Convention and how various countries react to its decisions. Europe may develop into a set of concentric circles with an integrated core and peripheral countries acting collaboratively on issues of security and economics. The entry of the Czech Republic and Hungary may be an easy matter, but Russia and Turkey attempting to adopt policies consistent with European norms may be more complicated. The processes of broadening and deepening may not be contradictory.

I share David’s belief that the “constitutional software” of the European Union is of limited relevance to other places in the world. I place great importance on democratic governments and their repertoire of institutions, values, and practices that can be used to create confederal or federal systems. Democracy is a kind of secular religion that allows countries with different national identities to avoid exaggerating them and demonizing their neighbors. If countries that want to join the EU are required to adopt features of liberal democracies, Eurasian and Asian cases are problematic. Latin America, however, seems promising, as the example of NAFTA shows.

Finally, the issue of security makes Eurasia different from Europe. David’s view of Chinese dynamism joining with Russian natural resources and Japanese capital overlooks the fear of China’s neighbors that any collective security pact would entail Chinese dominance. I do not see other external inducements for developing a security pact.
The Western Hemisphere as a region has its own institutions and organizations. Various countries have their own legal systems, but the region shares a set of values and aspirations and a commitment to democracy. The central problems it faces—drugs, security, and trade—can be dealt with on a regional basis. If the Organization of American States did not exist, we would need to invent a similar political organization.

The central problem of the hemisphere is the asymmetrical power of the US. Relations with the US have always aroused great mistrust, and the OAS has been generally seen as an instrument of US control and domination. Recently, impelled by demography and geography, an extraordinary advance in regional integration and coherence has led to NAFTA and the integration of Mexico with the US. The future of the Western Hemisphere may be reflected in NAFTA, although some South Americans consider Mexico a traitor to the Latin American cause.

Others hope that political and economic integration will result in greater political solidarity with the US. The Bush administration, which at first seemed interested in the project, since September 11 has allowed real set-backs to develop and important historical problems to be exposed, although we should not lose sight of the important distinction between economic and political problems.

The other key player is Brazil, who, with the US, directs progress toward a free trade area in the Americas. The achievement of this goal depends on the two countries agreeing on fundamental issues. The new leftist government in Brazil is concerned with dealing with issues of equality and poverty before it is willing to play an effective role on the regional stage. Washington is undecided about whether Brazil is a threat and a troublesome rival or a positive force for building a broader, stronger, and more effective community. The future of the economies of these countries is crucial to the future. Despite their shared aspirations, the
situations in Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia are so serious that no solution will be found for 10 or 15 years.

How will the US deal with the region? It is one of the few actors with the capacity to affect the future. The problem of US domination is not as worrisome as that of indifference, in which Latin America is seen merely as a backyard of the US. The drug-fueled violence of Colombia, the oil-rich political polarization in Venezuela, or the possible financial collapse in Argentina, though complicated, are manageable and can be contained. The US should be engaged more actively in this region, but so far we have not developed broad strategies. The US's proper role is neither to dominate nor withdraw but to serve as a catalyst for change. There are only a few signs that we are moving in that direction.

SESSION TWO
Robert Jackson
Response

I will not discuss American foreign policy, but reflect on the notion of the Western Hemisphere, especially the northern part, as a region. It is quite a strange place, resembling neither Europe, South America, nor most fragmented regions of the world. It is a highly simplified continent, concerned primarily with domestic politics and of very little interest internationally, dominated as it is by Canadian-American relations. North America is America, unified in a most remarkable way by Manifest Destiny. The rest is residual, marginal, and insignificant. The question of whether the region can be unified even further raises the issue of the US relationship to Canada.

The intimate diplomatic relations between the two is based on a cultural similarity that makes a Canadian virtually indistinguishable from an American. The situation may fragment and the idea of Canada itself may fail if Canada cannot deal satisfactorily with Quebec. If Quebec becomes independent, what will become of the rest of Canada? Will it recognize Manifest Destiny and join the
US? Will the US be willing to accept them and the significant financial burden of the Maritime provinces?

Perhaps a little radically, I see the future as fragmentation and reunification. With the exception of Quebec, North America will become identical with the US. Edmund Burke characterized the East India Company as “a state disguised as merchant.” I would apply his words to the US, an empire disguised as a republic disguised as a democracy. And Canada? An international system disguised as a federation.
The US had two overarching policies toward Eurasia in the post-Soviet period. The first was to develop friendly relations with Yeltsin and to allow him to do whatever he wanted internally. The second was to develop and exploit Caspian energy resources, in particular a single-pipeline project that would bring oil and gas from the Caspian, across Turkey, and into Europe while by-passing Russia. The first policy failed, but the second succeeded. Because of consistently high energy prices, Baku-Ceyhan is now beginning construction.

US-Russian strategic relations are probably the most important in the region and represent one of President Bush's policy successes. Quite apart from their value as energy sources, the Caucasus and Central Asia are important to the US for strategic purposes and in the fight against terror. Thus the natural resource losers of the former Soviet Union were last year's winners, and countries that had no oil or gas got a US base. US engagement has opened a window of opportunity for an improved economic climate. Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic, though by no means democratic, are some of the more reform-inclined regimes in that region.

2001-2002 was a banner year for Eurasia. US secretaries traveled there and all of Europe was talking about it. I do not think this interest is sustainable, not because this region will become less important, but because Iraq will occupy the attention of the US, who can juggle only so many balls. We will probably forget Afghanistan unless there is another terrorist attack. US-Russian relations, because they are based on national interests that are as important to Putin as to any American president, are likely to be a keeper. A great deal of intelligence and support for the US comes from Russia and cannot be supplied by other sources. Access to bases and coordination on other security issues will remain substantial issues. A US-Russian deal on Iraq is pretty much in place.

Energy is a primary interest in Eurasia. Siberia has overtaken the Caspian in global energy importance. Having secured US support for security in such places as Georgia, Russia will cooperate with the US and cement these ties.
US-Iranian relations will not improve unless the Iranian regime changes. The pro-Iran lobby pretty much dried up after the “axis of evil” speech, and the Bush administration has not said much on the issue recently. But we may see a great deal of stability in Iran if Hussein were removed and reformists in Iran were able to remove conservatives from power. Although that is likely to lead to short-term violence, it might in the long term attune Iran to global markets and globalization.

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are likely to compete for sub-regional dominance in the Caspian, although Kazakhstan is undermined by corruption and the Giffen case. The greatest disappointment so far has been the Ukraine, which, partly because it shipped technology to Iraq, is off the table in terms of NATO enlargement. For many reasons, Russian-Ukrainian ties have not been consolidated. While the Ukraine is retrenching its relation to Russia, economic ties will remain extremely important.

China will play a significant long-term role in the region because of its need for water and energy, but I don't see it becoming a major player in the next five years. Japan, on the other hand, might very well sneak into the big Siberia energy game. Keep an eye on the Koizumi-Putin summit. If the Japanese do not have a say in Russian economic development, they may lose out to China. The pipeline from Kazakhstan to China is on the drawing boards, but it’s a slow and expensive project. The Chinese want to get in on the central Siberian fields, as do the Japanese, an effort the US is likely to support. Oil reserves in Siberia are much larger than in the Caspian.

SESSION THREE
Walter Connor
Response

Although Russia is a great regional power, it is not clear what its future or its orientation toward Europe and Asia will be. Right now its tough, hands-on president seems willing to make difficult decisions. Its balance sheet is currently looking pretty good, and our alliance with them seems to be holding up. There
are still some scary things which we should look at, especially in light of 1989 and 1991 when the wheels came flying off.

The first problem is the fragility of the Russian population. It is hard to think of a country on the upswing with Russia’s declining population. Too many people are dying prematurely and not enough people are being born. Some sort of existential doubt about the future is afflicting those who must produce the next labor force and the military. The second problem is health. The country simply isn’t ready for the impact of HIV. Given the fertility situation and a health reversal that has hit people in their middle and productive years, a dramatic impact will be followed by unforeseeable social ripples.

Although Ian has made much of how much Siberian oil there is, the country still depends, apart from weaponry, on an export mix that consists of low-value-added merchandise. Russia is still a taker, not a maker of price, and is dependent on price fluctuations in the world market. They have not managed to diversify significantly, but were carried in an otherwise stagnant market by high oil prices. In terms of its relation to Eurasian business, Russia could be a wreck since its regional power is conditioned by the scale and power of its Eurasian neighbors. The Ukraine is not likely to do much better and Belarus and Moldova are pretty atrocious.

That brings me to the issue of what kind of regional power would Russia choose to be. Since it is locked out of successful, institutional Europe, it may have to choose to define itself as Eurasian. But it may not have the resources to make that kind of choice. In Prague and other places, boundaries have closed and gates have dropped over a newly defined Europe, while most post-Soviet states remain locked out on the other side.

The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, all countries that mix Protestantism and Catholicism, have been admitted despite squawking from Russia. The second phase of NATO expansion, which may bring in other parts of eastern Europe, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—and perhaps also Romania and Bulgaria—does not include accepting Russia as a member. The first wave of expansion surprised almost no one, involving as it did states that were so compact. The new wave will reaffirm the boundary around the old Roman Empire
and emphasize traditional markers. Russia is still out of the range of possibility, even in terms of trade with the EU, which is still quite marginal.

A big gap exists between Europe and Eurasia. Most Europeans see Russia as Asiatic, and it is not surprising that Christianity is being cited as a reason for excluding Turkey from Europe. The new happy Europe of the EU is pretty much post-Christian, though its churches remain empty, and post-Western-Christianity leaves people with a different mindset than Orthodox Christianity or Islam. Those tensions are likely to remain.

Baltic and ex-satellite countries, having escaped the taint of being considered Eurasian, have been folded successfully into the new Europe. It is rather iffy whether Romania and Bulgaria can also cross the line. That would also mean the exclusion of the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and, of course, Russia, who could all consolidate in a region we might call Eurasia. That situation might last a long time. Who could undertake a broadening of their institutions? Thousands of Belarussians, Ukrainians, and even Russians who show quite a good work ethic will cross the eastern Polish border every day. If the Poles get edgy, Brussels will squeeze them into behaving like good Europeans.
ONE FUTURE OR MANY?

SESSION FOUR
Maya Chadda
Asia: Will It Be the Power Center of the Future?

Asia is so vast and diverse and contains so many civilizations—many of them on various trajectories of development—that we will by-pass the problem of defining Asia. If not, we will spend the entire session on preliminary questions. The concept of Asia is a Western idea. Asians do not think of themselves as Asians, but in terms of nationality, ethnicity, religion, region, etc. I approached the question by focusing on regions, clusters of states that share history, geography, cultural overlap, and the potential for economic interdependence. Three countries will give us some sense of what will happen in Asia: India and South Asia, China and East Asia, and Indonesia and Southeast Asia.

Each emerged as an important power in its own region in the context of ongoing debates about each country. For example, is India a hegemonic power, or one that pursues a defensive dominance? Will China, historically an aggressive, lordlike expansionist state, pursue a muscular, robust policy, or will it be primarily defensive? The debate about China focuses on the acquisition of weapons and the modernization of its armed forces. Whether this is an offensive or defensive posture is a question of relativity. China may be modernizing itself because it perceives itself as weak in comparison to other countries.

We also wonder how Chinese domestic issues interconnect with foreign policy ambitions. If, as some maintain, China’s government is well established and will not destabilize, we can expect China to continue moving in its present direction. I have some doubts. Factors that led to Tiananmen Square are still operating, including a divided political class. Growth in China is reaching the rate of 6 or 7 percent. In 40 or 50 years its GNP will equal that of the US. Three scenarios are possible: stability and growth; fast growth, requiring basic structural reforms that would certainly destabilize the country; and a balance between unleashing forces of growth and keeping a lid on and managing it.

Whether China is an aggressive power depends on the expansion of Chinese military power and the military and economic expansion of other Asian countries. Military expenditures in other Southeast Asian countries have grown enor-
mously as a function of their expanded economies. India has acquired nuclear weapons, not to match China, but to keep her at bay. In other words, China faces limitations based on relative shifts in the balance of Asian power and problems of managing future internal instability.

Economic reforms in India have created a different kind of system. The days of the Congress Party are gone, having been replaced by coalition government. A strong center with weak regions has given way to strong regions with a weaker center, thus creating problems for political stability in China. The Indian system is pretty sound and stable. They have expanded the economy and managed the electorate while remaining a democracy. The core objective for both is national, territorial, and political consolidation.

That same is true for Indonesia, which has slid from being an economic miracle to chaos, instability, and turmoil. It is difficult to predicts its future, but it could potentially be an important power in Southeast Asia. It is promoting regional integration as a way of protecting itself and keeping China and the US at bay.

Asia will remain a region with several centers of power. Dominant states will avoid war in order to pursue objectives of consolidation. The US and China are likely to build selectively cooperative relations, and China is not likely to challenge the US presence in Asia. India, too, will accommodate the US presence, which is a new development. The Afghan war and the US returning to Asia present a new context. In the past India has tried to maintain maximum autonomy for itself by keeping superpowers out of South Asia. India is using the US to contain Pakistan so that it does not have to go to war itself.

Prospects of regional integration as we find them in Europe are dim to non-existent. Given the diversity of styles and relative importance of each country, Asian international relations are hierarchical. History has cheated them by leaving nation-state consolidation incomplete, just as these countries are emerging as powerful and confident. They must now redefine the power of the state between the public and private, despite their national quests having been built on the idea of sovereign, hard nation-states. Only constituencies for regional
integration are growing in Asia. Those wedded to the notion of nation-state are infinitely stronger.

**SESSION FOUR**

Constantine Menges

*Response*

I have a different view of China. Any kind of regional integration in Asia is likely to be a *pax sinica*, which in three steps will develop from Chinese dominance in East Asia, to all of Asia, and finally Eurasia. That is the Warsaw Pact model, but it is worth thinking about China in different terms.

I am concerned about China for several reasons. The tragedy of the post-Tiananmen period was the refusal of the Communist Party to permit political liberalization. I believe Li Peng goaded the whole process, including the demonstration itself, in order to bring about a forceful crackdown and stop political liberalization cold in its tracks. There will be no political liberalization while they are opening up the economy, have international relations, and pursue economic expansion and the four modernizations—industry, science, technology, and military.

American policy, including Bush’s secret mission of Scowcroft and Eagleberger, has been to allow Chinese domestic repression of civil rights as the price for increased trade. American presidents of both parties have been assuring us that political liberalization will happen some day. Despite the faith of leaders of both parties in Congress, we’ve been waiting 30 years, and it hasn’t happened yet.

From 1990 to 2000, the Chinese enjoyed a one-way access opportunity with the markets of major industrial democracies, while keeping their market mostly closed. Devaluation in 1994 and coerced, unfree labor have been very advantageous to US corporations. The Chinese trade surplus in that period amounted to $720 billion, in addition to more than $500 billion in commitments for foreign direct investment and a $75 billion commitment from the World Bank and Asian
Development Bank. That comes to $1.2 trillion that Communist China has received from the major democracies.

China claims we are its major trading partner. But we are also its prime enemy. The disparity between their claims and the truth of the situation matches the Third Reich buildup, when England year after year believed its special trade status with Hitler would soften his heart. The Chinese strategy is different, of course. China has used military force suddenly and aggressively on three occasions, and for four decades has supported armed insurgency. It asserts territorial claims with 11 of 14 neighboring countries and harasses aircraft and ships. It claims the entire South China Sea, the international waterway for world trade and Japan’s lifeline. It is engaging in a significant military buildup, which includes information warfare. It has been a major proliferator of weapons of mass destruction and advanced technology. It has conducted large-scale espionage.

The most important reason to be concerned, however, is China’s strategy of stealth-dominance. No one is looking at what China is doing. I expose it in my forthcoming book, 2007: The Preventable War–The Strategic Challenge of China and Russia. Our own government is divided by regions, but China is pursuing a worldwide strategy, including in Latin America. China may attempt to take control of Taiwan, neutralize Japan and South Korea, and even threaten to destroy American cities if the US dares to defend Taiwan. East Asian dominance would follow and then Eurasia.

An official white paper of the People’s Republic of China claims no state should have a security alliance with the US. It directs Japan to get out of its alliance with the US. The Chinese wish to have the US continue to provide the money and technology for their economic and military buildup, while they stealthily move to dominate other countries in 25 years. I do not think the process is inevitable, but, as Sun Tsu said, one should aim not to win battles, but to defeat the enemy without battles.
One Future or Many?

Session Four

Ralph Buultjens
Response

Today’s papers were all characterized by an assumed optimism that the US will remain as powerful for the next 25 years as it has been. But that may not be the case. I agree with Professor Chadda’s choice of emphases, but my views of them are somewhat different.

A good deal of China’s future—as, indeed, India’s—will depend on a banking crisis that could undo the economic gains China has recently made. It could also be undermined by a tension that must give at some point between an increasingly liberated economy and a tightly controlled polity. India’s role in the region will depend to a large extent on the way it meets a series of challenges. India’s stated past policy was grounded on several fundamental commitments—to democracy, economic advancement, the secular state, and nonalignment—which have now become subject to revision. Indonesia is much like Turkey with its moderate Islam, the support of its army for the political system, and its problems of fragmentation. Both nations sit aside strategic waterways and both suffer from financial collapse and the destabilizing effects of elections. The rise of Islamist sentiment will dwarf all other considerations for the future of Indonesia. Since leadership is the key to the way these countries will progress in the next few years, I wonder what kind of leadership will emerge.

I would like to suggest some alternatives to Professor Chadda’s choice of India, Indonesia, and China as regional leaders. India’s pattern from 1950 to 1990 was not very impressive, but its development since 1990 has been. Is this recent improvement a fluke or a fundamental change which will move the country forward? In Southeast Asia, I am more impressed by Vietnam than by Indonesia. It has 75 million of the most purposeful people in the world, who have been held back by a system that is beginning to change. In the next 25 years Vietnam will overtake many Southeast Asian countries. In East Asia, we should look carefully at Korea, which, if it unifies, will have a population of 70 million. One part already enjoys a high level of development and major exports, which could fuel a dynamic new center that might overtake China.
I also think expatriate communities will be critical to economic development in these countries. The Indian diaspora—20 million people—produces as much as the entire Indian economy, and a good part of it goes back to India. Overseas Chinese amount to 55 million. Indonesia does not have that kind of diaspora, so the prospect of a kind of pressure from outside is not likely to move it. Part of Russia’s problem is the absence of such an expatriate community. But Korea has one and Vietnam soon will.

The big question remains whether we can assume the US will continue to be the great power it is today. In the past, countries with enormous power—the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and British empires, and now the Soviet Union—have gone down the chute very fast. We should hold a conference on whether the US will be able to sustain the expectations expressed by our participants today.
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