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The theory and history of authenticity

Lindholm, Charles

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Boston University
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The Social Origins of Authenticity

What actual circumstances favored the rise of authenticity as a vital goal in today’s society? Lionel Trilling attempted to answer this question when he described the growth of authenticity out of the simpler and more modest virtue of sincerity, which itself arose in response to the momentous shift out of Feudalism. According to Trilling, the concept of sincerity first emerged as a precursor to authenticity in the 16th century as a result of the gradual breakup of the face-to-face relationships of traditional European society. As was the case in many other premodern traditional societies around the world, the highly personalized universe of Medieval Europe was held together by a taken-for-granted social order that provided its members with secure positions in a divinely sanctioned hierarchy. Local authorities served church and state, and were served in turn by their vassals. The family replicated this order, with the father exercising a sacralized authority. This stratified and sanctified worldview validated the daily lives of the faithful. For most of those living in this cosmically ordained system, there was little or no travel away from their locality, and little or no social mobility within it. Under these circumstances individuals were constrained by the obligations entailed in their predestined social roles. What mattered was not personal sincerity and purity of intent, but only whether persons were able to live up to their obligations to the neighbors and kinsmen they had known and who had known them all their lives.

This stable world was transformed utterly by the breakup of the feudal system and the massive movement of individuals out of the countryside and into mixed urban
environments. Henceforth, people were no longer quite sure where they belonged, what their futures held for them, or who their neighbors were. They had begun the irreversible plunge into modernity, which can be succinctly defined as the condition of living among strangers. In this new, desacralized and unpredictable environment it became possible for some ambitious men and women to break out of their prescribed roles and pursue secular dreams of wealth, power, and fame. But the pleasures and possibilities of social mobility coincided with feelings of alienation and meaninglessness, as well as the potential for guile and deceit. Former inferiors could now pretend to be better than they actually were; origins could be hidden and high status positions claimed without any legitimate basis; neighbors could cheat and betray one another and vanish into the anonymous urban wilderness. It is not surprising that the original definition of the villain was the dissembler, a lowly person who rises by cunning. In this ambiguous milieu it is also not surprising that sincerity, doing what one says one will do, became a desired trait. The erosion of a sacred hierarchy, the fragmentation of roles and the sense of a loss of significance were met by the sincere person’s reliance on inner integrity to establish trusting and meaningful relationships. As Polonius advises his son: “To Thine own self be true and it follows as the night the day that thou canst not be false to any man”.

This shift was supported by the dogmas of a newly rising Protestant bourgeoisie who had begun to transform the moral climate of Europe. The Protestants asserted that all persons are ultimately responsible for their own salvation. According to their doctrine, no one could intervene between the worshipper and God; no priest could interpret the confessions of the faithful and absolve them of their sins or sell them guarantees against damnation. Instead, the members of the congregation had to become worthy of
redemption on their own. This could only be accomplished by scrutinizing their souls to uncover and root out any evil impulses. Since they were required to practice self-interrogation and purification, the Protestant faithful tended to become urgently concerned about their own motivations: for them, it was not enough to act morally, they now had to be certain that the intent behind the act was also wholesome. As a result, sincerity became a defining virtue among this vanguard population.

The rise of sincerity also correlated with the radical egalitarianism that was practiced and preached by Protestants, who not only defined themselves in opposition to the hierarchies of the Catholic church, but also against the formalities of a remote and increasingly illegitimate courtly society. Instead of an ostentatious display of silks and jewels, they self-consciously wore plain clothing and appeared without adornment, revealing themselves in public ‘as they really were’. Similarly, they made a practice of simple speech that did not employ any of the flattery and rhetorical flourishes of the gentry. But the requirements of modesty and sincerity had paradoxical consequences. The first was the ambiguity of representation. How could persons thrown back on their own interpretations of themselves and their duties be certain that the appearance of sincerity was not actually the result of self-delusion and pride? Couldn’t the unpretentious man actually be sinfully proud of his modesty, couldn’t the believer persuaded of his sincerity actually be the worst of hypocrites, capable of lying even to himself? The second was the relation between the perception of inner truth and the demands of the social order. Couldn’t being true to one’s own intuition of right and wrong be more important than conforming to what is required by society?
Because their doctrine considered all human beings to be spiritual equals in the eyes of God, the most extreme Protestants even believed they could and should speak to aristocrats without honorifics or etiquette. That this might lead to dire consequences did not matter to them; they would be rewarded in heaven. Their critical attitude toward authority easily spread to self-questioning. How are we to know what we are really like, and what God really demands of us? Many Protestants tormented themselves with internal debates about these knotty matters of conscience, self-deception, and duty, as we know from the diaries and autobiographies that proliferated as an outlet for their spiritual anxieties. As a result, they were passionately concerned to discover an ultimate and absolute truth, outside of social norms and emotionally compelling. This moved them away from the social virtue of sincerity and toward the more solipsistic goal of finding a guiding inner light – that is, of achieving authenticity.

Support for this transformation came from another quite unexpected direction: scientific reason. From the time of Galileo, thinkers had tried to make their findings based only on their own critical examination of the material at hand, carefully weighing and measuring claims against consequences. Scientific investigation required taking all the relevant data into account and ensuring that no emotional bias, prior authority, or false reasoning contaminated the conclusions. This skeptical practice was encapsulated by the slogan of the Enlightenment made famous by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Sapere aude – usually translated as ‘think for yourself!’ But Kant’s famous reference to the creative powers of personal imagination as the source point for true knowledge had been anticipated by René Descartes (1596-1650), who believed that true self could only be discovered by eliminating preconceptions and all social and personal convictions.
“I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will eliminate from my thoughts all images of bodily things...I will regard all such images as vacuous, false and worthless. I will converse with myself and scrutinize myself more deeply; and in this way I will attempt to achieve, little by little, a more intimate knowledge of myself.”

Descartes detached himself from the rules and standards of the world and looked within in order to find the ultimate and undeniable principles that could be the basis for building a true and logical system for understanding the laws of nature, which he believed would put human beings in concordance with the mind of God. His quest was, in its essence, a transcendental one. By favoring introspection, discounting civilizational influences and in its indifference to moral constraints, the Cartesian pursuit of a valid science supported an increased focus on discovery of one’s own authentic being.

The gradual triumph of capitalism and the predominance of wage labor provided yet another impetus toward development of the modern ideal of authenticity. In the old system, a worker’s inner feelings and sense of self were irrelevant, since each person was locked into an occupation that would last a lifetime. It was enough that the role was enacted properly. But when work in the open market was no longer hereditary or connected to any larger meaning system, labor began to lose its capacity to define identity. Instead there was increasing alienation from work that seemed meaningless and, worse, destructive of the worker’s eternal soul. Revulsion was especially directed toward the obligation to act obsequiously in order to please employers. Previously, subservience was part of a larger cosmic order of deference; now it stood athwart the new ideal of equality. Workers had become capable of imagining something better for themselves,
but they also knew they could be dismissed for expressing resistance; as a result, for
many their occupation was no longer a calling demanded by God, but rather became the
enforced imposition of unwanted inferiority by an increasingly alien and antagonistic
authority.

As a result of all these factors, the early Protestant distaste for aristocratic artifice
was easily extended to become a generalized contempt for role-playing in general. As one
writer put it: “Born Originals, how comes it to pass that we die Copies? vi To balance out
the perceived distortion and repression of newly discovered individual personalities and
universal souls in the competitive open marketplace, people began to believe that their
common humanity demanded free sharing of genuine (that is, authentic) feelings when
among intimates. The association of personal authenticity with familial intimacy,
spontaneous emotional expressivity and an overturning of all forms of pretense also was
connected to other aspects of the European transformation to modernity. As Judith
Shklar informs us:

“(O)bsession with the true inner self and with the hypocrisy of playing social
roles is related to the personal experiences of.... social mobility.... Romantic
morality may reflect much of the anguish of people who leave the social world of
their childhood behind them and adopt new manners and roles. The true inner
self is identified with one's childhood and family, and regret as well as guilt for
having left them behind may render new ways artificial, false, and in some way a
betrayal of that original self. This personal self is seen as having a primacy that
no later social role can claim; and indeed the latter may be despised as
demeaning, 'stereotyped,' or simply 'fake' - in any case less genuine than the primordial self". vii

As a result of this split the workplace came to be pictured as an arena of battle, where combatants must put on carapaces and conceal their true feeling selves behind their standardized roles in order to protect their emotional vulnerability. Emotional armor and constraining responsibilities may only be shed at home, among family or friends. Only then can the worker feel free to express the feelings that have been kept bottled up at work. The rupture divides an instrumental public universe, which is experienced as inhibiting and destructive to the real self, from the emotionally expressive intimate home, where authentic being can blossom and be embraced. viii However, the content of the desired real self is necessarily undefined, a potential waiting to be revealed. The individual seeking self-realization becomes "the empty subject, capable of anything yet satisfied with nothing, the `long-distance runner' of modernity" ix

The repudiation of public roles also had profound political implications. Judith Shklar’s remarks are again apposite: “If men accept themselves as the sum of their roles, it is said, then they are doomed to inequality. Only if we assume that there is a self, apart from all social definition, which is capable of morality and therefore deserves respect, can we justify the claims of equality on which not only social justice but liberty itself depends.” x In other words, the claims for human equality that are essential to the liberalizing Enlightenment project imply and even require belief in a sacred and universal moral self, existing outside of, beneath, or beyond the social framework. However, the premise of a sacred presocial self does not only support the political right of each person to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, it also can motivate spiritually thirsty
individuals to search for the wellspring of the soul gushing beneath surface convention and appearance. When individuals try to quench their spiritual yearnings by drinking from this deep inner source, sincerity has evolved into authenticity.

The social consequences of the new emphasis on personal authenticity were profound. Protestants throughout Europe began to declare that they were no longer obliged to follow whatever rules were handed down from above; instead, one’s duty was to make a personal judgment as to whether those rules were moral and equitable. These judgments could be made by referring to one’s inner light; that is, to the authentic moral truth emanating from within, and not by obedience to the conventions attached to social roles. Soon enough, this critical attitude spread beyond the church. In the same fashion as a Protestant church member had a duty to leave the congregation and find another more in tune with his or her values, thinking men and women in Europe and later in America began to make personal decisions as to whether the state deserved their loyalty. If not, the citizen had an obligation to stand up in opposition to the injustice and, in the extreme case of France, to overturn the state and establish a new one that would offer them an authentic community, envisioned in a way not very different from a covenanted Protestant congregation.

This new, spiritually tinged attitude toward the collective is captured by the historian Lynn Hunt, who argues that the revolutionary *san culottes* were motivated by their strong “belief in the possibility and desirability of 'transparency' between citizen and citizen, between the citizen and their government, between the individual and the general will. For them, there should be no artificial manners or conventions separating men from each other and no institutions blocking free communication between citizens and their
delegates.” Instead, there should only be the collective sharing of “authentic emotion.”
Similarly, the great French historian Jules Michelet evoked the mystical aspect of the individual citizen’s relationship to the encompassing revolutionary commune. "Speak not of egotism. History will answer here, quite as strongly as logic. It was at the first moment of the Revolution, at the moment she was proclaiming the rights of the individual, it was then that the soul of France, far from shrinking, extended, embraced the whole world in sympathetic thought." As we shall see in the case studies to follow, Michelet’s passionate invocation of the power of nationalism to ignite a form of religious fervor and commitment has become increasingly familiar in the modern era, when the authenticity of individuals and the genealogies of nations have been more and more intimately linked.

**The Literature of Authenticity**

The rise of authenticity as a value was echoed in European literature. According to Trilling, the first to write about personal authenticity was Moliere (1622-1673) who followed his satire *Tartuffe* with *The Misanthrope*, a comedy about the futile attempts of its hero Alceste to impose absolute standards of truthfulness on French court society.

The two plays are illustrations of two very different ways of understanding the world. *Tartuffe* is a fraud and flatterer who has no delusions about the self-aggrandizing nature of his trickery and deceit. For him, a sin is not a sin if it is not witnessed. In contrast, Alceste asserts that “a man should be a man, and let his speech at every turn reveal his heart to each; his own true self should speak; our sentiments should never hide beneath vain compliments.” Moliere portrays Alceste as a ridiculous figure: a self-righteous narcissist whose unrealistic demands lead him to isolation and disaster. He is “the new
hypocrite (who) simply adjusts his conscience by ascribing noble, disinterested, and altruistic intentions to all his behavior. He is the sole instructor of his own conscience."

Molière’s satirical treatment of Alceste shows that personal authenticity, especially in its guise as authenticity of content, had not yet become a cultural ideal in the 17th century, though its outlines were known. But soon authentic protagonists began to be seen in a more positive light. Written in 1761, Denis Diderot’s dialogue between himself (the philosopher) and Rameau’s nephew marks a crucial step in this evolution. The self-aware hero, known only through his relationship with the famous composer, xvii is Protean, emotional, witty, and creative; Diderot (1713-1784) likens him to a grain of fermenting yeast restoring individuality and creativity to a stultified society. But unlike the rigidly self-righteous nobleman, Alceste, Rameau’s nephew is an outsider, a con man, a liar, and a toady who willingly demeans himself for the entertainment of others. This is necessary, he says, because the world is composed of the powerful and the weak. The latter must cringe and crawl, playing the servile roles required of them. Even the courtier must fawn and simper before the king. Rameau’s nephew, because he is powerless, must do the same, but unlike the rest, he does not delude himself about reality or his position. “I’m never false if my interest is to be true and never true if my interest is to be false.” And, unlike Alceste, he is able to live in the world, while at the same time seeing it for what it is. xviii

In this great book The Phenomenology of Mind, the romantic philosopher G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) depicted Rameau’s nephew as the first of a new type of radically authentic individuals who could no longer identify with society and instead embrace
fragmentation and marginalization, “rending and tearing everything” and pouring
contemptuous scorn on the lifeless and fraudulent world of the bourgeoisie. Shameless,
perverted, and “conscious of its own distraught and torn condition,” xix this figure is the
prototype for Dostoevsky’s underground man, Sartre’s Saint Genet, and the other
corrosively obscene, marginal, criminal and deviant anti-heroes of the modern age whose
very existences repudiate a milieu that is taken to be hypocritical and oppressive. As
Marshall Berman puts it, “The search for authenticity, nearly everywhere we find it in
modern times, is bound up with a radical rejection of things as they are.” xx

However, in his anxiety to portray Rameau’s nephew as a paragon of
revolutionary contempt for the status quo, Hegel ignored some of aspects of his character
that would be influential to later romantic thought. In particular, the nephew was an
enthusiastic aesthete and a would-be artist who idealized natural spontaneous feeling in
music and in the soul. He tells Diderot “our passions have to be strong. The tenderness
of the musician and the poet must be extreme…. We want it more energetic, less
mannered, more genuine.” xxi As a proponent of heartfelt feeling, Rameau’s nephew is a
direct forerunner of another prototypical figure in the literature of authenticity, i.e.,
Goethe’s (1749-1832) most famous literary creation: young Werther, the wandering
sketch artist and doomed lover. Like Rameau’s nephew, Werther too sees through the
restrictive constraints of bourgeois society. "Why does the stream of genius so seldom
break out as a torrent, with roaring high waves, and shake your awed soul? - dear friends,
because there are cool and composed gentlemen living on both banks, whose garden
houses, tulip beds and cabbage fields would be devastated if they had not in good time
known how to meet the threatening danger by building dams and ditches” (emphasis in
the original). He too is a seeker after natural feeling in art, and he too defies social conventions.

But where Rameau’s indomitable nephew refutes the hypocrisy of the world with his caustic laughter, Werther – a more sensitive and sentimental soul - finds solace in his heart, “which is my only pride, and the fountainhead of all - all strength, happiness and misery. Anyone can know what I know. My heart alone is my own.” xxii Unhappily, his feckless heart leads him into a hopeless love affair. When that fails, he descends into depression and kills himself, inspiring a rash of real-life suicides throughout Europe. His is an early example of the secret affinity between authenticity and morbidity that was to be so characteristic of later German philosophy.

Goethe’s attitude toward his young hero was ambiguous; while he too favored feeling, he feared its excesses, and the final stark image of Werther’s brains spilled across the floor is a chilling warning against viewing the world through the lens of one’s emotions. Hegel was even more scathing toward what he regarded as a spectacularly destructive form of romantic consciousness, which he called “the law of the heart.” This is the notion that one’s own true feelings provide an adequate basis for judgment and action. Such a belief must, Hegel argued, lead to the sense that the external world, insofar as it does not conform to one’s desires, is alien and hateful. Trying to universalize one’s own feelings inevitably leads to “consciousness gone crazy…. The heart-throb for the welfare of mankind passes therefore into the rage of frantic self-conceit” as every consciousness seeks to impose its heart’s ambitions upon all others. xxiii

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was one of the figures Hegel had in mind when he castigated the romantic faith in the law of the heart. Rousseau, who believed
that Alceste had been quite correct to demand absolute honesty from the world, and from himself, became the first writer to present the reading public with a completely positive picture of an authentic individual who lives wholly according to his own emotional reality regardless of the opinions of others. It is no accident that this exemplary figure was Rousseau himself. In his celebrated autobiography he shamelessly revealed himself as self-serving, cowardly, obsequious, masochistic, sexually deviant (he was aroused by being spanked), and paranoid. As he proudly proclaims “let the numberless legion of my fellow men gather round me and hear my confessions. Let them groan at my depravities and blush for my misdeeds. But let each one of them reveal his heart at the foot of thy throne with equal sincerity, and may any man who dares say, ‘I was a better man than he.’”

Claiming superiority through the very act of exposing his worst defects heralded a new ideal of exploring and revealing one's essential nature – being true to oneself even while flying in the face of the moral standards of society. For Rousseau, as for his Calvinist forefathers, so long as a person heeds the prompting of his or her inner being, the judgments of others count for nothing. He concludes, “To live is to make use of our organs, our selves, our faculties, every part of ourselves which gives us the feeling of our own existence. The man who has lived the longest is not he who has passed the greatest number of years, but he who has felt life.”

The Philosophy of Authenticity

Rousseau spent his career trying to understand the relationship between ‘the sentiment of being’ and the rules of civilization. As he famously remarked in the first page of The Social Contract, “Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”
According to Rousseau’s extremely influential anthropological theory of human origins, this degradation occurred because the growth of civilization has destroyed our original natures, which were motivated only by *amour de soi* (self-love); referring only to ourselves, we were without greed or ambition. Only with the gradual development of the division of labor, and the differences in wealth and property that resulted, did humans learn to covet our neighbor's possessions and to puff ourselves up in hopes of exciting envy. Motivated by *amour propré* (vanity), we sought prestige and status at the expense of others and became slaves of culture and tradition, living lives that are just play-acting. We are now only capable of experiencing ourselves when reflected in the eyes of others. If admired, we are proud; if held in contempt, we despise ourselves. Civilization has robbed humans of our independence and deformed our true natures; it has made us slaves of power and imitators of fashion. Not only are we enchained; we have even grown to love our chains, and to embrace the social world that has destroyed our genuine being. Under these conditions, “The majority of men are quite unlike themselves, and often seem to transform themselves into different men.”

For Rousseau, some remnants of the original authentic character of humanity could still be found in simpler cultures, which are closer to the pure state of nature. As we will see, his nostalgia for the primitive and the essential was manifested in later theories of tribal purity, nationalism and ethnic pride. Equally influential was his belief that children were repositories of humanity's fundamental innocence, which finds its modern expression in therapeutic injunctions to find authenticity by ‘getting in touch with the inner child.’ Finally, Rousseau also believed that certain receptive souls, such as his own, were more attuned to hear the authentic promptings of the heart. They could shut
out daily reality and discover fulfillment through cultivation of reverie and other trance-like states of consciousness. “As long as this state lasts, we can call ourselves happy, not with a poor, incomplete and relative happiness such as we find in the pleasures of life, but with a sufficient, complete and perfect happiness which leaves no emptiness to be filled in the soul.” In this passage, Rousseau prefigured the use of meditation, drug use, and other aids to transcending ordinary consciousness as aids in the quest for authenticity.

Rousseau’s theories about authenticity met an enthusiastic response in Germany. There Herder, Schiller, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Goethe and others prepared the ground for a new vision of human existence proposed by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900).

Nietzsche detested the dull and predictable bourgeois world inhabited by “natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge.” According to Neitzsche, the predominant Christian slave morality, motivated by a psychology of ressentiment against the strong and the vital, hides its baseness behind guilty conformity and soulless respectability. Things become worse with modernity, which diffuses primal experience into a plethora of ‘objective’ abstractions, a stifling of the instincts, a debilitating sense of being “a strolling spectator” in life, and a feeble nostalgia for the passions of a lost past. Under these dire circumstances, “no one dares appear as he is, but masks himself as a cultivated man, as a scholar, as a poet, as a politician.” Redemption from this falsity cannot come from religion, since “nothing turns out to be divine any longer unless it be error, blindness, lies.” Rather, the seeker must tear away the veils of convention, morality and faith. “Let him follow his conscience, which calls out to him: ‘Be yourself! What you're doing, supposing, desiring now - that's not you at all.’” Those few who have achieved “productive uniqueness” are transformed,
and shine with a “strange radiance.” They are “the new, the unique, the incomparable, those who give themselves their own law, those who create themselves.”

But there is an even more revolutionary aspect to Nietzsche’s ‘transvaluation of all values.’ This is his understanding of the will to power as the source of authenticity in a modern world where God is dead and nihilism rules. The will to power is defined as "above all an affect and specifically the affect of the command." Only when human beings actually experience a subjective sensation of vital empowerment can they realize themselves as authentic and self-actualized agents. "Great men, like great epochs, are explosive material in whom tremendous energy has been accumulated." Unlike Goethe’s tenderhearted aesthete who seeks ultimate significance in hopeless love, Nietzsche’s heroes of authenticity are dangerous ‘blond beasts’ whose innate capacity to command is the ultimate value in a world lacking any other values:

What is good? - All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man.

What is evil? - All that proceeds from weakness.

What is happiness? - The feeling that power increases - that resistance is overcome.

While Nietzsche’s high evaluation of the will to power can easily be interpreted as a paean to Fascist brutalism, in fact his historical consciousness and radical individualism would certainly have led him to disdain Nazi bureaucratic totalitarianism and Hitler worship. The real apologist for Nazism among German philosophers was Nietzsche’s critic and most influential interpreter, Martin Heidegger, whose extraordinary book Being and Time stands as a landmark in the discourse of authenticity. Although he
was far more inward, ahistorical, and mystical in his orientation than his precursors, Heidegger was like Nietzsche and Rousseau in his fear of immersion in the everyday, average, taken-for-granted reality of generalized others – *das Man*, the ‘they’ - who define our *Dasein* – our being. In normal social life “everyone is the other, and no one is himself…. The Self of everyday Dasein is the *they-self* which we distinguish from the *authentic self* – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way.” For Heidegger, the self as it ordinarily exists is inauthentic; it lives only in imitative and subservient relation to the anonymous and ubiquitous ‘they.’ Even curiosity, he says, is a way to avoid confronting authentic being by losing the self in restlessness and distraction, “never dwelling anywhere.” xxxv

For Heidegger, to achieve authenticity one had to rigorously clear away the external and internal obstacles, temptations and delusions which bar the way to genuine spiritual self-realization. This effort was concretely expressed in the repudiation of the hustle and variety of cosmopolitan urban life, and in the cultivation of folk crafts, a plain unadorned language, and a simple, self-sufficient rural lifestyle. Action was valued over discourse and reflection, which only obscured the purity of authentic *Dasein*. It was the Nazi’s willingness to act forcefully, and seek a more primordial and emotional truth in mystical *volk* consciousness that convinced Heidegger – at least for a short time - of their potential to rejuvenate the German soul. However, there is perhaps a deeper conjunction between the two. For Heidegger and his followers, the purpose of the obstacles to authentic self-realization, ontologically speaking, is to conceal the actual condition of the self from the self. This actual condition is the temporality of existence – the harsh fact of one’s own death. Authenticity then can only occur through coming to terms with fatality.
The connection between authenticity and death, hinted in the Greek etymology of *authentes* and by Werther’s descent into suicide, is here given full philosophical validation. xxxvi Is it a coincidence that the Nazis too embraced death as the completion of life, and made the death’s head their emblem?

If Heidegger saw personal authenticity as the open-eyed engagement with one’s own temporality, his disciple Jean Paul Sartre had a different perspective. xxxvii Even though he pointedly refused to define authenticity in his masterpiece *Being and Nothingness*, xxxviii throughout he argues that the human being, because it possesses consciousness, is necessarily “a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.” This paradox leads to an inevitable gap between the self as an object (in-itself) and as a transcendence of being (for-itself). Vacillating in the unbearable ‘metastable’ state between self-objectification and limitless and contentless freedom, the psyche tries to convince itself of its own solidarity, and so feebly accepts the performance of its social roles as real, while still knowing they are merely poses. Thus the waiter acting like a waiter is attempting to persuade himself (and others) that he *is* a waiter in the same way an inkwell is an inkwell. But by the very act of performing the role, the waiter is alienated from himself. “In vain do I fulfill the functions of a café waiter. I can be he only in neutralized mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by mechanically making the *typical gestures* of my state.” xxxix For Sartre then, as for Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Rousseau, identification with social roles kills any possibility for authenticity.

However, Sartre’s psychology is even more negative than that of his predecessors. Consciousness is inevitably drawn into bad faith because of the gap of nothingness that lies between constituting oneself as a thing, and the awareness that self-constitution is an
action which implies one is not that thing. We are, Sartre says, lost in a kind of permanent self-ratifying and yet shaky delusion, in which we prop up our disintegrated existential condition and deny our ultimate responsibility for our own impossible freedom. Therefore, one cannot be one’s true self because doing so constitutes the self as a thing in order to escape contingency. Yet somehow the struggle to be authentic continues as an active preconditioning principle in his system. Sartre also attempts to understand relationships with other human beings through his notion of being ‘for others’. However, it is significant that the prototypical ‘for others’ relationship in the Sartrean universe is one in which the voyeur peeking though the keyhole is himself spied upon. In fact, for Sartre the content of relationships is more or less limited to shame (for the one viewed and objectified) and domination (for the viewer and objectifier).

In his later work, Sartre gives more credit to the power of circumstance, and to the positive aspects of relationships with others, yet his basic message is that we can never achieve "an exit from the torment that comes from the futile attempt to secure ourselves in being, things, objects, and the world… but we can free ourselves from the hell of pursuing it." Sartre thus presents us with an almost Calvinist vision of the authentic life, in which the anguished consciousness is caught in the existential paradox of being what it is not and not being what it is, and enmeshed in a world where there is no possible meaning or direction. However, where the Calvinist could hope for salvation, the existentialist can only recognize the self as the “incontestable author” of its meaningless and incoherent fate. The solution is a kind of Buddhist or Stoic retreat from the world through the dissolution of desire.
As part of his own pursuit of authenticity, Sartre (like Rousseau) insisted on the personal and autobiographical sources of his preoccupations. Raised in a hypocritical upper-bourgeois household, as a child he accepted “that one feigns passion in order to feel it, that human life is a ceremony. I had been convinced that we were created for the purpose of laughing at the act we put on for each other.” Sartre reacted against refinement and mannered falsity all his life, vowing that he would never let any role subsume his real being, as the waiter is imprisoned in his performance. Instead, he brought to the pursuit of authenticity not only a heroic and tragic ethic, but also a rebellious and yet queasy attraction to the perverse, the ugly, and the criminal – in this Sartre is the direct descendent of Rameau’s nephew.

In the same vein, Sartre praised blacks and Jews for what he saw as their authentic spontaneity and emotional openness. Jews were especially valued because as exiles they did not have the objectifying delusion of belonging to any place and so came closer to being for-themselves. Furthermore, as marginalized and oppressed, Jews (and blacks) could refuse bourgeois pretensions to universalism. "Jewish authenticity consists in choosing oneself as a Jew - that is, in realizing one's Jewish condition.... He knows that he is one who stands apart, untouchable, scorned, proscribed - and it is as such that he asserts his being." In other words, for Sartre the authentic Jew was precisely the Jew who lived out the stereotypes imposed upon them by anti-Semites. For this reason, the truly authentic Jew (or black) could never be assimilated into French society. But the actual content or consequences of the authenticity of marginalized others was never of great interest to Sartre. For him, the ostracized served primarily to destabilize the bourgeois world and its pretenses to morality, purity, and authority. As we shall see, this
stance fits well with the romantic appreciations of the authenticity of tribes, ethnic
groups, and races that will be traced in later chapters.

Sartre’s existentialism found many converts in the United States, where its focus
on the individual’s responsibility for his or her own fate resonated with American cultural
values. But in fact, a popular native-grown cult of authenticity was already well
developed in the United States as part of what William James (1842-1910) termed the
faith of the once born or healthy minded; a belief system he prophesied would be the
religion of the future. Instead of concerning itself with the irreversible reality of human
suffering, as existentialism and its continental predecessors had done, James notes that
the American once born faith is optimistic and hopeful. Pain and misery are illusions that
individual human beings, by dint of spiritual discipline, can conquer. This can be
accomplished by tearing away the restrictive veils of reason, culture, and convention that
separate the individual human soul from the sacred core of the self, as intuited by the
heart. Purified, the believers can then touch the primal source of being and experience the
expansive joys of cosmic unity and personal redemption.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) put the self-referential and spiritual aspect of
this particularly American brand of authenticity best in his famous essay “Self-Reliance.”
As he writes: “I must be myself. I cannot break myself any longer for you, or you.
If you can love me for what I am, we shall be the happier. If you cannot, I will still seek
to deserve that you should. I will not hide my tastes or aversions. I will so trust that what
is deep is holy, that I will do strongly before the sun and moon whatever only rejoices
me, and the heart appoints.” For Emerson, realizing and expressing one’s own inner truth
was a priority above and beyond conventional notions of good and evil. “No law can be
sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable
to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution; the only wrong what is
against it.” xlviii

James’ prediction that the pursuit of personal authenticity would dominate
modern American spirituality can easily be verified by entering any bookstore. The
shelves are weighted down with advice from New Age gurus and therapists who instruct
seekers how to discipline themselves in order to unleash their inner child, reach a higher
spiritual plateau, find a power source, heal themselves, free the thin person within the fat
one, or play better tennis. What is characteristic of these self-help books is that the
techniques offered are not simply means to achieve a particular end, but rather are
supposed to help the readers get in touch with their authentic selves. Having achieved
this ultimate goal, clarity of thought, happiness in relationships, success in business, a
cure for angina, a slimmer figure, or a better backhand will necessarily follow. While
existentialists suffer in the alienating world, American once-born enthusiasts succeed in
conquering it.

The burgeoning popularity of an ethic of authenticity appalled a number of
American cultural critics such as Allan Bloom, Daniel Bell and Christopher Lasch, who
decried it as pure hedonistic narcissism masquerading as philosophy. Weak, self-
indulgent, and incapable of moral action or even of defending their own beliefs in any
coherent fashion, the New Age propagandists were destroying the moral fiber of the
nation in favor of feeble relativism and thoughtless self-indulgence. In response, Charles
Taylor mounted a spirited defense of authenticity rightly understood. He claimed that
even the proponents of authenticity had been misled by an overemphasis on self-

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realization, and so had neglected the moral and social aspects of living an authentic life. “Self-choice as an ideal makes sense only because some issues are more significant than others.” The most important and motivating issues, Taylor argued, arise in a modern context where positions are not ascribed, and people must prove their value to one another. When identity is generated, not given, persons must discover and ratify who they really are through dialogue; the authentic person cannot exist alone, but must win the recognition and respect of others. He concludes on a hopeful note: “perhaps the loss of a sense of belonging through a publicly defined order needs to be compensated by a stronger, more inner sense of linkage.”

Taylor rightly draws our attention to the social aspects of the pursuit of personal authenticity, but neither he nor other modern theorists devote much (or any) space to exploration of the implications and consequences of the pursuit of collective authenticity. Perhaps this is because the rise of individualism has been the most striking aspect of modernity, or perhaps it is because collective authenticity, as manifested in nationalism, has a bad reputation, since the exemplar case is Nazi Germany. Whatever the cause, it is remarkable that the recent philosophical literature on authenticity has ignored collectives. This despite the fact that Romantic thinkers, Herder above all, believed that nations had their own essences, which needed to be preserved and expressed in the lives and works of the citizenry for them to be true to themselves. This lacuna is correlated with another absence. The emphasis in modern thought has consistently been on authenticity as correspondence – on being what one is. But, as I noted in the introduction, authenticity has another meaning as well. That is, the authenticity of origin, of genealogy, of roots. Certainly this overlaps with the notion of correspondence, but it points in a different
direction, away from the self, and toward history, tradition, and ancestry, all of which are associated with collective identities of nation, tribe, and race. Finally, none of the critics or theorists of authenticity have had much to say about the way authenticity is actually pursued. ¹ In the next chapters, I’ll use ethnographic and historical accounts to show how people look for authenticity, and how nation and individual, genealogy and identity, are intertwined in that quest.

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**Endnotes:**


² For a history of these developments see Norbert Elias (1978) *The Civilizing Process: The Development of Manners* New York: Urizen (original publication 1939).

³ The increasing prevalence of self-portraits, mirrors, and autobiography during the 16th and 17th century are all taken by Trilling as evidence of the rise of sincerity and authenticity as new virtues


⁵ Rousseau was the most articulate spokesman for this new form of alienation. He had worked as a servant, and his hatred of inequity and demeaning labor permeates all of his writings. See James Miller

⁶ Edward Young quoted in Trilling op.cit.:93.

viii For an example of this formulation see Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, Steven Tipton 1985 *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* New York: Harper and Row. That this division is a social and historical construction is generally not subjectively grasped. It is felt to be natural and is taken as given. See chapter 17 for more on the split between public and private.


x Sklar op.cit.: 76-7.


xiii Lionel Trilling op.cit.

xiv Moliere, like the other writers to whom I will refer in this chapter, did not actually use the term ‘authenticity’ in their works. However, the content shows that what I have defined as authenticity was foremost on their minds.


xvi Sklar op.cit.: 58

xvii His actual name, never mentioned in the dialogue, is Jean-Francois Rameau.

xviii Denis Diderot *Rameau’s Nephew*


xx Berman op.cit.: xix.

xxi Diderot op.cit.: 70

unpublished obscurity in France, and drawing it to Hegel’s attention. For an illuminating study of the manner Diderot’s essay effected German philosophy, see James Schmidt 1996 “The Fool’s Truth: Diderot, Goethe, and Hegel.” History of Ideas: 625-44.

xxiii Hegel op. cit.: 396, 397.


xxv quoted in Berman op.cit.

xxvi Social contract


xxxi Nietzsche The Gay Science: 335. Note that Nietzsche did not believe self-creation and the realization of authentic agency could occur in a vacuum. Extremely conscious of the conditioning authority of history, language, and culture, he never fell into the romantic fallacy of the ‘law of the heart’ so decried by Hegel. For more, see Mark Warren 1984 “Nietzsche’s Concept of Ideology.” Theory and Society 13 (4): 541-565.

xxxii Nietzsche 1966 Beyond Good and Evil: 25.


xxxiv Nietzsche 1977 op.cit.: 115.

xxxv Martin Heidegger Being and Time 165, 167, 217.

xxxvi It is noteworthy in this context that the heroine of Rousseau’s great novel Julie finds authenticity in her only spontaneous act: suicide. As Adorno caustically comments, Heidegger’s doctrine can be seen as an exegesis of the joke “only death is free and that


xxxviii In a footnote at the conclusion of Part One Sartre mentions that authenticity can be defined as a self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted by bad faith. However, the description of authenticity “has no place here.” *Being and Nothingness:* 116. Yet clearly authenticity is the hidden topic of the book, which can be understood as an answer to and extension of Heidegger’s *Being and Time.*

xxxix Ibid: 100, 103.


xli Note that Sartre, in order to conceptualize the drive toward authenticity, is obliged to posit a prereflective consciousness which ‘already knows’ what consciousness wishes to suppress, and which is the source of the effort to assume responsibility for the self and culture. Thomas Busch 1990 *The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstances in Sartre’s Philosophy* Bloomington: Indiana University Press. In making this posit, Sartre comes close to the phenomenological notion of the *epoché*


xliii Sartre op. cit.: 553


xlv Sartre *Anti-Semite and Jew* 136-7

xlvii James shared the once-born faith that the nonrational and expressive are at the core of human experience. In this great book *The Varieties of Religious Experience* he argued that the study of psychology had to go beyond empiricism and embrace emotion, intuition and subjectivity if it was ever to hope to understand human motivation. James practiced what he preached, and put emotional expressivity first in his own life. As he once said, for him “every gush of feeling should be followed by adequate action.” Quoted in Lewis

xlviii Ralph Waldo Emerson “Self-Reliance.” As Adorno comments, “In the name of contemporary authenticity even a torturer could put in all sorts of claims for compensation, to the extent that he was simply a true torturer.” Op. cit.: 125.


1 Taylor’s brilliant book Sources of the Self provides an exhaustive overview of the philosophical history of the rise of personal authenticity, but does not rely on case histories to establish the way authenticity has actually been sought.