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vision that they can only see what their Grand Theory permits them to see -- that is, that the choice of Grand theory itself amounts to no more than a declaration of the policy-maker's taste preferences.

A. LAW AS POLICY'S IMPLEMENTER

Policy itself brings no social change. If a political authority declares (let us say) a policy favoring free markets, that does not cause free markets to blossom hither and yon. If declared policy to end inflation asserts the need to cut the money supply, the money supply will not obediently reduce its size. Until transformed into law commanding relevant actors to behave in desired ways, policy remains mere rhetoric (Lowi 1987).

For a variety of reasons, some scholars denied the potential efficacy of law. Here we discuss only two of these. First, some insisted that, since no one can isolate a law's effect on social behavior from other factors (Kidder 1983), attempts to use law instrumentally can at best be hit-or-miss, at worst, dangerous. A law-maker necessarily unsure about the consequences of a law places society at serious risk. For example, if a law-maker does not know with a high degree of certainty how a new law will affect agricultural production, it might lead to a disastrous reduction in the food supply. Better, they say, to make only small, incremental changes (cf. Lindblom, 1985).

That objection assumes that because lawmakers typically do little research on the reasons for behavior in the face of a rule of law, they lack the capability of doing so. Absent adequate research, of course a lawmaker who attempts more than incremental change acts recklessly. That by no means argues that knowledge of law's consequences for behavior lie beyond the reach of research.

Secondly, some legal scholars follow deconstructionism. Inherent ambiguity renders a law's language like silly putty (e.g., Tushnet 1985; Singer 1984). This ambiguity permits administrators and judges to construe it at will, too often to benefit the rich and powerful. However much reason informed by experience controlled the policy- and law-making processes, they constitute mere illusion; in the end, power motivated by ininterest and prejudice controls. Although reasonable speakers of a language may disagree about the meaning of the penumbra of words, however, they usually can agree on its core meanings (Hart 1960:124). Courts or administrative agencies typically redefine meanings only in cases that turn on the ambiguities in the penumbra. Agencies need not inevitably interpret laws to serve the rich and powerful.

1. A local ordinance that states that "No vehicles may be driven in the park" plainly prohibits driving automobiles in the park; that constitutes a core-meaning case. Whether it prohibits a motor-driven wheel chair for a disabled person does not seem at all clear; that constitutes a penumbral case. Culturally-acquired understandings that the ordinance aims to protect the peace of the park permit construction of the word "vehicle" to prohibit automobiles, but to admit wheelchairs (cf. Fuller, 1958).
Devices to lower the risk of that omnipresent danger exist; research can discover them.

These two objections to the use of reason informed by experience to control effective policy-making confuse frequent sorts of lapses from that ideal with the inevitability of those same lapses. The objections that flow from philosophical positivism and from post-modernism search deeper.

B. THEPOSITIVIST OBJECTION

Philosophical positivism makes a sharp distinction between facts and values, Is and Ought, description and prescription. The Is, they say, can never determine the Ought.

Policy inherently concerns the Ought. Policy states what the policy-maker proposes to do; it states his prescriptions for the polity. All law implements policy; all law therefore concerns the Ought. Decisions about the Ought can never derive from the Is. Reason can help in determining policy, but not experience.

In that view, the function of empirical research in policy- and law-making consists merely in advising decision-makers about the consequences of various possible courses of action (Weber 1949). What course the decision-maker chooses depends upon the sort of person he is.

Development practitioners often perceive their task as one of providing options for decision-makers. They usually do so by describing alternative scenarios: If the law-maker does thus-and-so, then these will be the likely consequences. The choice rests with the law-maker. Providing alternative scenarios or options has a deceptive air of neutrality, comfortably relieving the consultant of any responsibility for the outcome. By choosing which scenarios to offer, however, the consultant effectively structures choice. Henry Kissinger, the former American Secretary of State, is said to have remarked that if he had the opportunity to specify the options, he did not care who made the final decision. Not empirically-bottomed description of probable scenarios, but the values of the researcher determine outcomes.

Philosophical positivism leads to the most popular prescription for a policy-making methodology, ends-means: "[I]n order to decide rationally, policy-makers must specify their objectives; lay out the alternatives by which the objectives may be accomplished; evaluate the consequences of each alternative; and choose the action that maximizes net benefits" (Majone 1989:12; cf. Lindblom 1963).

The choice of ends depends on Ought propositions, that is, on values; the choice of means, on Is propositions, that is, on facts. In determining what ends to pursue, law-makers rely on values (Majone 1989), either their own or those identified as community opinion (Long 1969). This assumption of an Is-Ought dichotomy has four adverse consequences. First, if ends depend entirely upon 'values', and if experience and values suffer a complete divorce,

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2 Majone uses the term "decisionism" for what we here call "ends-means".
then the process of choosing particular ends precludes consideration of social experience. Ends-means limits investigation primarily to assessing the consequences of employing alternative means to attain the ends chosen according to authority's (not necessarily stated) values.

Second, in the ends-means approach, law-makers typically proceed directly from stating their goals to proposing possible solutions. Because it contains no explicit requirement that they investigate the causes of social problems, law-makers have no way of ensuring that their solutions will do more than poultice symptoms. Because they exclude consideration of causes, ends-means decision-makers exclude academics (whose special expertise consists of research into causes) from contributing to the law-making process. Universities embody most third world countries' richest reserve of social knowledge, but ends-means often excludes their expertise from law-making (Coleman 1975:19; Braybrooke 1965:2).

Third, by assigning means exclusively to the realm of the is, ends-means implies an amoral thrust. If the choice of means excludes valuations, its ethical status rests solely on the proclaimed validity of the ends: The ends justify the means.

Finally, ends-means implies an authoritarian perspective. If law-makers need not bring experience to bear upon their choice of ends, they need not provide the public with evidence to justify their proposals. They need only claim that these goals represent the values of the society's leaders (Weber 1949). In this view, the legitimacy of policies turns, not on rationality based on experience, but on the presumed legitimacy of the policy-maker.

Inevitably, the ends-means methodology bolsters hierarchy. Those in power make policy. Superiors give orders to subordinates; subordinates only need seek how best to carry them out. The world around, this approach permeates most 'modern' institutions. People receive their education in hierarchically-organized schools; work in hierarchically-organized enterprises; when ill, go to hierarchically-organized hospitals; and, when dead, rest in hierarchically-organized cemeteries. In most third world export enclaves, property-ownership regimes endow a few individuals -- the owners -- with the power to decide economic ends. Most citizens exert limited (if any!) influence over the choice of means. Even in polities proclaiming representative democracy, a few officials typically enjoy enormous decision-making power.

The ends-means methodology limits participation in political decision-making to elections in which voters periodically vote for leaders whose value-sets they believe most reflect their own. In practice, this transforms voting from a system of citizen participation in decision-making, resting on the use of reason informed by experience, to a choice of leaders based on taste. That degrades the democratic process to the "mobilization of bias" (Bachrach & Baratz 1963).

To obscure its innate authoritarianism, proponents of the

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3 Thus their social practices too often reaffirm Ulpian's dictum: Because it pleases the prince, it has the force of law (Anton 1979).
ends-means approach usually assert a societal value consensus. Since in real third world communities no value consensus did (or could) exist (Ch. 3), this claim too often served to justify policies that reflected, not the needs of the mass, but the interests of the rulers. In practice, third world governments' and international agencies' power to give or withhold resources commonly enabled them to impose their goals on target communities. Ignorant of community value sets, even benign agencies pushed programs embodying their own, not the beneficiaries', ends (Kalyallya et al. 1986). As a result, as suggested by the desert of failed third world projects, community members equally frequently carried out the stated policies (if at all) only woodenly, or even actively undermined them (cf. Davidson 1992b; Klitgard 1991; Korten 1990).

C. THE POST-MODERNIST OBJECTION

In its seemingly endless variety, post-modernism aped the chameleon. At its heart, it challenged the Enlightenment project (Hunt, 19^\text{AA}). That project depended on the notion that people could understand their physical and social environments; understanding, they could create workable solutions to both physical and social problems. That post-modernism denied.

It sprang from a proposition now widely accepted by many who deny post-modernism: That we can only see that for which we already have a concept or hypothesis (Gadamer, 19^\text{AA}; Popper, 19^\text{AA}). Outcomes depend not only on the matters observed, but the hypotheses with which the observer entered the empirical arena.

What determines whence policy-makers derive their hypotheses? Some scholars held that these derived from their world-views. Those world-views, they held, inherently defied empirical warrant. For some, world-views constituted ideal-types, setting out its vision of what the world might be -- an ideal market economy for the neo-classical economist, an ideally-function planned system for some varieties of socialists. For others, even to the extent that world-views contained descriptive proposition ("the deepest and moist common motivation for human action is material self-interest"), these defied empirical warrant. Each world-view has its own built-in logic. That logic determines the search for data to warrant or diswarrant the propositions that make up the world-view in question. Trying to diswarrant a world-view fell into inescapable circularity.

Positivism denied a priori the possibility of using experience to formulate policy; all depended upon the subjective values of the policy-maker. Post-modernism went further: By denying the possibility of using experience to test whatever factual propositions underpinned a particular world-view, it denied the possibility of ever testing a world-view against data. The next section contests both of these positions.

II. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF TESTING WORLD-VIEWS AGAINST EXPERIENCE

An alternative exists. It begins by adopting a problem-
solving rather than an ends-means methodology; argues that various devices exist for controlling discretionary choices in that process, of which control by large-scale explanations for the world (or 'Grand Theory') constitutes one; and that in principle researchers can put to empirical test the propositions that constitute Grand Theory.

A. A PROBLEM-SOLVING METHODOLOGY

In lieu of ends-means, with its chasm between Is and Ought, policy-makers can adopt a problem-solving methodology. That methodology consists of four steps: A statement of the behavior that constitutes the social problem (and data to test that statement); a set of alternative potential explanations for that behavior, and data to determine which of those explanations will survive; a set of alternative proposals for solution aimed at the causes revealed by the surviving explanations, and data to determine the most cost-effective (in a broad social sense) of those possible solutions; and its implementation and monitoring (and data to warrant the propositions that constitute the results of the monitoring) (Seidman, 199A).

B. GUIDING DISCRETIONARY CHOICE

Critics object that whatever the possibility in principle of falsifying grand theory, in practice that remains beyond human reach. World views remain non-commensurable; reason informed by experience cannot persuade those who see the world through a different prism (Lauden 1984; Kuhn 1970; but cf. Lakatos & Musgrave 1970).

If valid, that criticism would return both grand theory and policy-making to the realms of taste: I like Marxism, you like neo-classical economics, in the same way that you like chocolate ice cream and I, vanilla. The criterion of reason informed by experience counts only as kitsch4: Mere mystification, myths to persuade peasants of government's legitimacy. Only those who focus on the efficacy of power -- pluralists, public choice theorists, and some Marxists -- have it right.

Proponents of problem-solving contested the two arguments critics advanced as to why researchers could not falsify grand theory. First, by definition, the critics held that the general explanatory propositions characteristic of grand theory remained falsifiable only in terms of very general aggregate data -- all subject to debate. Unable to agree on the data's interpretation, researchers cannot agree on what counts as falsification (Kidder 1983). In problem-solving, however, researchers logically derive middle-level propositions from grand theory to explain particular problems, and then rigorously test them against evidence. To the extent that these middle-level propositions prove false, the grand

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4 "Kitsch...is the dazzling insipid smile that human beings use to cover what is 'essentially unacceptable in human life'" (Abrams, 1986:941).
theory from which they derive may also prove false (Ch. 4:15).

Second, the critics asserted that, in searching for the data to test middle level propositions, researchers must use spectacles with lenses ground from prescriptions derived from that same theory (Gadamer 1990:265ff; Rubin 1988:1840; Schutz 1974; Winch 1958). Those spectacles blind them to evidence their grand theory does not identify as relevant. Falsification of middle level propositions becomes impossible; ipso facto, falsification of a grand theory by evidence remains an impossible dream. (That constitutes the heart of post-modernism [Hunt 19]. The problem-solving methodology, however, rests on the premise that doing -- praxis -- can test the truth of middle-level propositions, and thus transform that dream into reality (Winch 1958:57, 100; Box 5.1).

That doing -- praxis -- can and does falsify middle level propositions and thus, indirectly, grand theories, finds its warrant in three aspects of everyday experience:

1) Acting purposively, people learn from their experience that causal relations structure real world phenomena, and that they can continually improve their comprehension of those causal relationships. To grow a tree, we plant not stones but seeds. We experience causality. To catch thieves, we put more policemen on the street. To act purposively, we rely upon our interpretations of experience. When our actions miss the mark, we reconsider the causal hypotheses on which we premised action, and sometimes even the conceptual lenses through which we originally perceived the project.

2) To ensure they do not overlook potentially more fruitful explanatory hypotheses to put to empirical test, researchers must consider alternatives. Researchers concerned with development policy, for example, should consciously put on a Marxist hat, a Weberian hat, and an institutionalist hat. In each guise they should tease out the relevant middle level propositions which, according to that perspective, might explain their development problem. By critiquing the consistency of each resulting set of explanations with relevant known facts, they can winnow out those that seem worth testing against further evidence.

Researchers’ conscious consideration of alternatives will help to prevent them from becoming so immersed in their "own" paradigms that they exclude data that other perspectives might call to attention. Once they have conscientiously examined but rejected explanations drawn from Marxist grand theory, researchers gathering evidence to falsify middle-level explanatory propositions derived from neo-classical economics can hardly avoid a sensitized peripheral vision relating to class and exploitation. Conversely, researchers who seek to capture data likely to falsify Marxist-derived hypotheses can hardly prevent perceiving (if only peripherally) evidence of market impediments (but cf. Rubin 1988).

3) The conditions of social struggle press the participants to expand their perspectives. In an earlier epoch, for example, practically all white males in the United States assumed women and blacks had less capacity than themselves. By the end of the twentieth century, largely due to women’s and blacks’ intense agitation, many white males recognized that proposition as false.

A problem-solving learning process requires investigators to
recast their world views, or perspectives, as sets of logically consistent explanations, or grand theories; tease from them middle-level time- and country-specific propositions; and test these against real world facts. If a specific proposition proves inconsistent with those facts, the researcher must either revise it so it both fits and remains logically consistent with the overall explanatory hypothesis; or reject it -- and with it, the grand theory from which it derived.

Praxis, peripheral vision and social struggle: All combine to substantiate the premise that policy-oriented researchers can use evidence -- experience -- to falsify middle-level explanatory propositions, and therefore the grand theory from which they derived them. The criterion of reason informed by experience does not constitute mere kitsch. In principle, using grand theory as the guide to discretionary choices can help ensure that problem-solving performs on its promise to ground policy on reason informed by experience.

CONCLUSION

The road to development runs long and rocky. The third world’s difficulties in realizing development’s promise reflected the failure of its post-colonial governors to exercise state power and law to change inappropriate institutions -- repetitive patterns of social behavior -- that fostered poverty and oppression.

Governors can change social institutions either in response to the imperatives of irrationality -- "values", intuitions, residues. The third world has tried that. The monumental disaster of most third world polities proclaims its failure.

An alternative exists; The use of reason informed by experience as the basis of policy- and law-making. Law-makers deprive themselves of the potential for doing that if they adopt either the positivist notion that values and facts occupy discrete spheres, or if they adopt the post-modernist view that the diswarrant of explanations of the world lies beyond human capabilities. Neither claim holds. A problem-solving methodology (instead of ends-means) holds the potential for reaching a proposal for solution that at every stage requires reason to formulate an hypothesis, and empirical data to warrant it.

Whether that can succeed depends upon the guides to discretionary choice in problem-solving. Using Grand Theory to do that holds out the potential for using propositions themselves potentially grounded in data as a guide in the problem-solving process. Claims that one cannot diswarrant Grand Theory seem without adequate warrant, since both by dis warranting middle level propositions teased out of Grand Theory, by the use of peripheral vision, and the actual praxis of social struggle, the proposition of grand Theory become subject to diswarrant.

The last decade of this century began with the hopes of third world independence littered in shards across a seemingly desolate moonscape. Dante inscribed one alternative over the gates to Hell: "Abandon all hope, ye who enter here."

Another alternative exists. Human beings constructed that desolation; human beings can change it. They can only do so,
however, by invoking their specifically human characteristics: Their capacities to solve common problems through democratic participation and cooperation grounded on reason informed by experience.